

# EVALUATION OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: HELPING OR GIVING ADDICTION TO THE PUBLIC

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**Submission date:** 13-Dec-2022 05:35PM (UTC+0700)

**Submission ID:** 1980098627

**File name:** IJD\_Kolaborasi\_Artikel\_2\_Haimah.docx (43.12K)

**Word count:** 7266

**Character count:** 39984

## EVALUATION OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: HELPING OR GIVING ADDICTION TO THE PUBLIC

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### ABSTRACT

The emergence of a pandemic caused a lot of difficulties faced by the community to survive. This caused the government to intervene and provide various assistance to the community. However, there are often problems in the process of providing this assistance. This study aims to evaluate social assistance provided by the government to the community. This research will be conducted utilizing a qualitative methodology. This study utilized secondary data acquired from still-relevant research or previous investigations. This study found that there was the use of incomplete data and confusing regulations, so social assistance was abused. Some people have jobs and decide to register on the pre-employment card. Then some people are economically capable but do not report themselves so that later they can still get social assistance from the government again.

**Keywords:** Social Assistance, Abuse, Community, Government.

### A. INTRODUCTION

At the start of the year 2020, a strange illness that originated in China and was eventually identified as the coronavirus or coronavirus sickness 2019 shook the world. In December of 2019 in Wuhan, China, coronavirus illness 2019 was first identified. On 31 December 2019, the Chinese government reported many cases of pneumonia in their country to the World Health Organization, namely the World Health Organization (WHO). After 114 nations reported instances of this virus, the WHO classified this incidence as a pandemic (Barbieri et al., 2020).

Based on WHO data, the development of confirmed cases worldwide continues to experience relatively high spikes. As of 4 September 2020, 26 million people were infected with the 2019 coronavirus. The spread of this virus was very fast and widespread not only in China but also spread to several countries, including the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). The 2019 coronavirus case was first announced by President Joko Widodo on 2 March 2020. It is known that there were two first patients in Indonesia, namely a mother and her child who lived in the Depok area, West Java (Chauhan, 2020).

There have been 6.7 million confirmed cases of Covid-19 in Indonesia, with an estimated 160 thousand deaths. The government has implemented a number of policies to combat the spread of the virus, including the designation of the Covid-19 virus outbreak as a

national disaster by Presidential Decree of the Republic of Indonesia number 2 of 2020 concerning Stipulation of Non-Natural Disasters the Spread of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). The government has implemented Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB) for areas included in the red zone by Minister of Health Regulation (Permenkes) Number 9 of 2020 concerning PSBB Guidelines (Widysanto et al., 2021).

In response to the Covid-19 Outbreak being declared a national tragedy and pandemic, several regions implemented PSBB on a massive scale. Due to reduced community engagement, economic activities have been disrupted, daily work is now difficult, and enterprises are laying off large numbers of workers as a result of being unable to maintain staff throughout the pandemic. Additionally, crime rose as a result of the reduction in income, therefore the government decided to provide social assistance as a form of state responsibility to the community in preparation for potential socioeconomic challenges related to Covid-19 (Kumala, 2020).

The government has not remained mute in the face of this tragedy. The government is swiftly responding to the repercussions of the economic crisis, such as providing social aid to the community, by establishing financial measures. This is a revolutionary approach to Covid-19. As of January 1, 2020, the Ministry of the Interior has issued Ministerial Regulation (Permendagri) No. 20 of 2020 on the Management of Covid-19. This regulation was promulgated in response to an order from the President to the Minister of Home Affairs to speed up the spending of regional governments' Allotment for Revenue and Expenditures (APBD) funds (Cipriano et al., 2020). This regulation gives regional governments the authority to change regional head laws governing APBD development in order to expedite the handling of Covid-19. Minister of Home Affairs decree states that APBD use must be prioritized by regional governments in order to predict and manage the impact of the spread of Covid-19, especially in terms of social support for affected populations (Basri et al., 2021).

Governments have always been among the primary sources of citizens' access to essential social services. Such social assistance is typically administered by the central or regional government in the event of a regional disaster, for example, but the community's reaction to the realization that it has been delivered still produces a significant degree of dissatisfaction. As recipients of various types of social assistance, the community receives routine services proportionate to their poverty level (Kostka, 2019). During the Covid-19 pandemic, the national and provincial administrations struggled to provide social assistance to the community. For example, in several reports, it is known that there are residents in Jakarta who have decided to return to social assistance because the assistance they received was not on target (Wasantari & Qadri, 2021). Meanwhile, in several areas in Jakarta, some residents are not recorded, even though they should be entitled to receive assistance. Then in Bali, some residents have died but are still listed as beneficiaries. Meanwhile, in Padang, there were complications related to the beneficiary database, even after being repaired, there were still errors in the beneficiary data (Asmorowati et al., 2022).

The government's aid, particularly from the Central and Regional Governments, is unclear, takes time to gain acceptance among affected groups, and falls short of actual needs. Has this social assistance problem in Indonesia's government been inherited, or is it the result of the great distance between the government and the community, as well as the presence of multiple channels in the distribution system or the supply of aid? (Djalante et al., 2020). The number of social assistance gateways causes varying schedules and perspectives, and the data

is occasionally inaccurate. Then many people take advantage of this misdirected assistance by receiving social assistance, even though they are not the party entitled to receive it. Social assistance is considered an opportunity to get something free during a pandemic (Feng et al., 2020).

Based on the brief explanation above, the researcher then intends to evaluate providing government assistance to the community during the Covid-19 pandemic.

## B. LITERATURE REVIEW

### 1. Government Social Assistance Program in Indonesia

Social assistance, as defined by the Ministry of Social Affairs, is a form of short-term financial aid given to the poor in the hopes that they might lead more stable lives. Social security, of which the social assistance program is a part, is a reflection of the central or local government's concern of the plight of the poor and neglected at the community level (Eriksson et al., 2020). Article 34, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of 1945 mandates that the state provide for and protect children who are unable to do it on their own. The state provides a social security system for all citizens and gives voice to the voiceless in a way that is respectful of human dignity, as stated in Paragraph 2 of Article 34 of the Constitution of 1945. (Engkus et al., 2022).

The goal of social welfare is to ensure that all members of society have the resources they need to have healthy, productive lives and to perform their roles in society. Children who are disadvantaged or neglected are entitled to protection under Article 34, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which was ratified in 1945. The Central Government and Regional Governments of the Republic of Indonesia provide social rehabilitation, social security, social empowerment, and social protection for the poor and neglected children as defined by the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. These policies represent the state's obligation to provide for the needs of its citizens who are unable to do so on their own (Sun et al., 2022).

As a result of a lack of access to government-provided social services, social welfare issues reveal that some locals are struggling to meet even their most fundamental needs. As a result, inhabitants continue to struggle to carry out social functions, making it difficult for them to live lives befitting human beings. As part of a concerted, ongoing effort to meet the fundamental needs of all its citizens, the Federal Government, the State Government, and the people's own voluntary organizations all provide various forms of social service, such as social rehabilitation, social security, social empowerment, and social protection (Fisk et al., 20218).

The legal system governs social welfare programs. On 16 January 2009, President Dr. H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono signed into law Law No. 11 of 2009 addressing Social Welfare in Jakarta. Since its publication in the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia, Year 2009, Number 12 on January 16, 2009, Law Number 11 of 2009 concerning Social Welfare has been in effect. This law was drafted by Andi Mattalatta, Indonesia's Minister of Law and Human Rights. To ensure that all Indonesians are aware of the provisions of Law No. 11 of 2009, the Explanation of that law is published in Supplement No. 4967 to the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia (Sinaga, 2020).

Only activities directly related to handling the Covid-19 pandemic, such as the procurement of medicines, medical devices, health infrastructure, human resources (including both health and non-health workers), and other related activities, may be carried out using funds allocated by Minister of Finance Regulation No. 43/PMK.05/2020 on the Mechanisms for Implementation of the State Expenditure Budget in Handling the Covid-19 Pandemic (Indini et al., 2020). Article 2 paragraph 1 letter d and letter k of the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2020 Concerning State Financial Policy and Financial System Stability for Dealing with the Corona Virus Disease in 2019 as a Reason for the Stipulation provides the legal basis for the requirements of PMK 43/2020. (Covid-19) The government has the authority to take actions that result in expenditures at the expense of the State Revenue and Expenditure Budget in context of Countering Threats to the Nation's Economy and Financial System, even if the budget to finance these expenditures is not yet available or insufficient, and to establish procedures and methods for acquiring goods and services, as well as simplifying mechanisms and streamlining procedures, in the event of a pandemic.

The legal basis for establishing PMK 43/2020 is (1) Article 17 paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia; (2) Law Number 39 of 2008 concerning State Ministries; (3) Government Regulation in place of Law Number 1 of 2020 concerning State Financial Policies and Financial System Stability for Handling the 2019 Corona Virus Disease (Covid-19) Pandemic and in the Context of Facing Threats that Endanger the National Economy and Financial System Stability; (4) Presidential Regulation Number 28 of 2015 concerning the Ministry of Finance; and (5) Regulation of the Minister of Finance Number 38/PMK.02/2020 concerning Implementation of State Financial Policy for Handling the 2019 Corona Virus Disease (Covid-19) Pandemic and Facing Threats that Endanger the National Economy, and Financial System Stability.

PMK 43/2020 addresses the following: (1) the procedure for implementing the budget at the expense of the State Budget in handling the Corona Virus Disease 2019 (Covid-19) pandemic; (2) the distribution of funds for handling the Covid-19 pandemic in the DIPA of State Ministries/Institutions. (3) in facilitating planning activities, coordinating implementation, and monitoring and evaluating the performance of handling the Covid-19 pandemic, the allocation of funds for handling the Covid-19 pandemic is grouped into the classification of a particular Covid-19 account; and (4) The implementation of PMK 43/2020 during the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic (Aubert et al., 2022).

Recording of expenditure transactions at the expense of the State Budget in handling the Covid-19 pandemic is carried out by referring to the Minister of Finance Regulation concerning the central government financial accounting and reporting system, namely: (1) Minister of Finance Regulation Number 215/PMK.17/2016 concerning Amendments to Minister of Finance Regulation Number 213/PMK.05/2013 concerning Central Government Accounting and Financial Reporting Systems; and (2) Regulation of the Minister of Finance Number 213/PMK.05/2013 concerning Central Government Accounting and Financial Reporting Systems (Sululing et al., 2022).

The distribution of social assistance spending to State Ministries/Institutions in the form of money can be done through Banks/Posts distributing social assistance to recipients of social assistance following the Minister of Finance Regulation regarding social assistance spending at State Ministries/Institutions, namely: (1) Minister of Finance Regulation Number

228/PMK.05/2016 concerning Amendment to Regulation of the Minister of Finance Number 254/PMK.05/2015 concerning Social Assistance Expenditures at State Ministries/Institutions; and (2) Minister of Finance Regulation Number 254/PMK.05/2015 concerning Social Assistance Expenditures at State Ministries/Institutions and Minister of Finance Regulation Number 254/PMK.05/2015 regarding Social Assistance Expenditures at State Ministries/Institutions (Adesina, 2020).

### C. **METHOD**

This research will be carried out using a qualitative approach. The implementation of this method will use secondary data derived from the results of research or previous studies that are still relevant to the contents of this research. After the research data has been collected, the researcher will then process the data so that the results of this research can be found.

### D. **RESULT AND DISCUSSION**

#### 1. **Problems in Government Social Assistance During the Covid-19 Pandemic**

The distribution of social assistance is not new for the Central Government and Regional Governments. However, there are always problems with distribution. Likewise, with the distribution of social aid that occurred during this pandemic. Phase one and two of social aid from the government are already underway. Some of the problems arising from the distribution of social assistance were conveyed by the community to the Ombudsman, and it is known that there are residents in Jakarta returning social aid due to the inaccuracy of the target for the provision of the aid, while there are residents who are not recorded who should be entitled to receive assistance. Then in Bali, there were also indications of residents who had died but were recorded as beneficiaries, and in Padang, there was complexity in the data on beneficiaries, even after being corrected, there were still errors in the beneficiary data (Singh et al., 2021).

Numerous social assistance issues have arisen in the national and regional administrations, as seen by the criticism surrounding the distribution of social aid. West Java's governor, Ridwan Kamil, was among those who voiced displeasure with how the federal government doled out social services, so the complaints weren't just coming from the common public. This critique pertains to the lack of data integration within the federal government. According to him, each Ministry maintains its own survey data, causing the Central Government and Regional Governments' statistics to be out of sync. Several Sukabumi village chiefs have rejected social aid provided by the Provincial Government of West Java as a result of this data disparity. They denied social assistance from the West Java Provincial Government due to the lack of correct data and the belief that it would overlap with data on residents enrolled as beneficiaries of the Family Hope Program (PKH) from the Central Government.

The numerous sorts of help offered by the government, such as Presidential Social Support, Provincial Social Assistance, Regency/City Social Assistance, and Village Funds, can potentially cause turmoil in the distribution of social assistance. The many types of social assistance can create confusion in the community, especially when the assistance does not

arrive simultaneously. Then, the Governor of East Java, Khofifah Indar Parawansa, raised the data collection issue. He noted that the government <sup>15</sup> should update the data qualifications for users of social assistance and not use data from the Social Welfare Integrated Data (DTKS) of the Ministry of Social Affairs, which was last verified in 2015. Because it is inevitable that many recipient details may change over time.

The difficulty in distributing federal social assistance can be traced back to a lack of accurate beneficiary records, as implied by the preceding statement. If the government wants to know who should receive social support based on the criteria for social support, it needs up-to-date and confirmed data on social assistance recipients every year, regardless of whether or not a disaster occurs. The Minister then completes the periodic, at least once every two years, process of assessing and confirming data regarding the poor. The Regent/Mayor is then informed of the outcomes of the data collecting verification and validation. After the Regent/Mayor has finished his or her report, it is sent to the Governor, who then shares it with the Minister. Meanwhile, those living in poverty who lack official identification can register with the Lurah or Village Head. Families on the official list of the poor must update the Lurah or Village Head if there is a change in household composition. Afterwards, the Regent/Mayor will review and revalidate the data before submitting it <sup>1</sup> to the Minister.

The difficulty in distributing social aid is not solely a <sup>39</sup> data issue. In a news conference following a secret meeting with President Joko Widodo, the Coordinating Minister for Human <sup>13</sup> Development and Culture, Muhadjir Effendy, stated that there were three issues with the provision of social assistance. The first issue is the disparate budget allocations for each Ministry. There is no budget issue at the Ministry of Social Affairs, however there is a budget allocation issue at the Ministry of Villages and Transmigration. According to the most recent data, 53,156 villages, or 70.9% of village funds, have received village funds, while 21,797 villages have not. Then, around 17 percent of 53,156 villages had village funds allocated as BLT to recipient families, or 12,829 villages.

The second issue is a data collecting issue, which necessitates careful data collection to avoid misdirection, resulting in a rather sluggish <sup>7</sup> distribution. The final issue is the distribution system; thus far, the data acquired by RT/RW must be validated by the Regency/City Government before it can be used to compile information on social assistance users. In order to expedite distribution, the verification step has been eliminated, therefore correcting the issue.

Regional Governments also experience many problems in distributing social assistance, both direct cash and non-cash assistance <sup>2</sup>. The inaccuracy of targeting, and double beneficiary data, which is the main problem in the distribution of social assistance in the regions, is also the problem of data that is not updated while assistance must be distributed immediately. For this reason, the knowledge of data collection officers in each region is needed to understand the terms and conditions of social assistance recipients <sup>13</sup>, both cash and non-cash. There are several obstacles found in the Regional Government. The first problem is data on recipients of social assistance, which still overlaps with other recipients of assistance, such as data on recipients <sup>21</sup> Cash Social Assistance whose names are also listed on the Village BLT program or other assistance programs such as the Family Hope Program and Non-Cash Food Assistance.

The second problem is that the data used is sourced from DTKS data obtained from territoriality through RT/RW. However, it is possible that the RT/RW forgot to include the

latest data affected by Covid-19, and affected residents did not report their data to the RT/RW. The third problem is a data problem that is often a problem in society, namely the lack of awareness in the community about the changes in the economic level that have occurred to him and his family. For example, when previously recorded as a beneficiary of assistance, but over time, the person concerned has a change in economic level from those who cannot afford to be able but do not report the change in data to the RT/RW or regional parties; so that they are still recorded as poor citizens who must receive assistance, while residents who were previously able but are now affected by Covid-19 do not report their data. This is a problem in the distribution of social assistance. The fourth problem is the lack of public understanding of the types and criteria for social assistance from the government, of which there are many types. So people often hear complaints about why they and their neighbours get different values or forms of assistance even though they feel they have the same difficulties. Some individuals sometimes use these mistakes to get more social assistance than they should (Rachaju, 2021).

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## 2. Evaluation of Village Fund Direct Cash Assistance

The federal government has sanctioned the utilization of municipal budgets as a direct cash support source. This is in accordance with Ministerial Regulation (Permendes PDTT) No. 6 of 2020 on Amendments to Ministerial Regulation (Permendes PDTT) No. 11 of 2019 on Priority for Using Village Funds in 2020, which ratified the change. Villagers who take part in RT/RW data collection are the intended recipients of this assistance. The Family Hope Program, Non-Cash Food Help, Pre-Employment Cards, and members of the family with chronic or potentially chronic illnesses are ineligible for this help. Over six hundred thousand Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) was donated. From April through June, we would greatly appreciate any help you can provide. Funds can be dispersed in one of two ways. Money will be wired to those who qualify for a bank transfer. People who are eligible but don't have bank accounts will have money sent to their homes in the meantime.

Problems that occurred with this type of social assistance less than two months after the government established this program, among others, occurred in Riau Province, namely the recipients of the Covid-19 BLT were cut so that they did not receive all the social assistance provided by the government. After investigation, it turned out that the deduction was not a direct deduction made by the local government but was caused by a BLT disbursement scheme through creating a bank account where the BLT funds could not be withdrawn in full because the bank system required leaving a minimum balance in the account. Then what happened in several remote areas of the archipelago experienced delays in the distribution of BLT social assistance, so there were still political elements of the past in the data collection and distribution of BLT, such as officials choosing to choose among their citizens who were known not to have voted for them during the election.

Referring to the problems in implementing the direct village cash assistance program, it can be concluded that the government has tried to fulfill its responsibilities following the 1945 Constitution Article 34, paragraph 1. The efforts made by the government are in line with constitutional regulations regarding social assistance. The government has planned various programs and realized them intending to help the welfare of the people affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the supervision is still not optimal, so this non-optimality often creates other more significant problems.



### 3. Evaluation of essential food assistance for the Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi areas

The President delivered special food assistance to Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi citizens (Jabodetabek). Beneficiaries are Jabodetabek area inhabitants who are registered in the Integrated Social Welfare Data (DTKS). The aid deployed since April is expected to continue until June 2020. The major food bundles supplied are valued at 600,000 IDR each family. The problems that occurred in this essential food assistance included, among others, that there was still a double distribution of critical food supplies to the community, such as the incident in Sukaluyu Village, Ganeas District, which made the village head stressed because of his protest and was blamed by the community who had not received the necessities, while his neighbours received two basic food aids which resulted in social tension and jealousy there. This was because the form of staple foods from the West Java Provincial Government was sent via PT Pos, this was considered not on target and different from the data submitted by the village head to the Sumedang Regent.

Based on the polemic over the distribution of essential food assistance, it can be concluded that the government has carried out the mandate of Article 34 of the 1945 Constitution. Regarding the existing problem in the form of inaccurate data, this is part of evaluating the implementation of the Covid-19 social assistance program. In the future, the government will need to use unified data to conduct more targeted inspections. However, the government's quick response in terms of data accuracy is expected to boost the implementation of social assistance policies, given that the pandemic is still persisting despite significant decreases.

### 4. Evaluation of Cash Social Assistance

The Ministry of Social Affairs implemented a non-cash aid for 9 million residents living outside of Jabodetabek. This policy is based on the Minister of Social Affairs issuing Decree No. 54/HUK/2020 concerning the implementation of Basic Food Social Assistance and Cash Social Assistance in Handling the Impact of Covid-19. The Regional Government handles recipient registration, sending data on prospective receivers to the Ministry of Social Affairs. The beneficiaries will receive assistance worth IDR 600 thousand for three months, starting from April to June 2020. Assistance will be transferred to the beneficiary's bank account for HIMBARA Bank (State Owned Bank Association) account holders such as Bank Mandiri, BNI, BRI and BTN. For those who do not have a HIMBARA Bank account, assistance will be sent by PT Pos Indonesia. The problems that occurred, among others, in Jepara Regency, there were more than 20 recipients of non-regular assistance from the central government (non-regular assistance) who had died and still received social assistance, and some who had died in 2013 were still recorded as recipients. Then other findings were also found in one of the villages in Batealit District, apparently, there was a National Identity Number (NIK) and the same name but different domiciles. This prevents data from being entered into or rejected by the system.

Based on the various obstacles encountered during the implementation of the cash social assistance program, it is possible to conclude that the government has failed to fully fulfill the mandate of Law Number 11 of 2009 concerning Social Welfare and the Minister of Social Affairs' Decree number 54/HUK/2020 concerning Implementation of Basic Food

Social Assistance and Cash Social Assistance in Handling the Impact of Covid-19. However, the government's attempts to execute the cash social assistance program are a manifestation of the government's responsibility to carry out Article 34 paragraph 1 of the 1945 Constitution.

### 5. Evaluation of Electricity Fee Waiver

The government waives fees for 24 million energy users with 450 kV capacity. The Perppu 1 of 2020, State Financial Policies and Financial System Stability in the Face of the Corona Pandemic, mandates this exemption. This offer is valid for three months, from April to June 2020. This charge decrease is available to all clients, not just those on the 450 kV level, while the Covid-19 pandemic continues. Customers of electrical companies with a 900 VA capacity or less will receive a 50 percent rate discount from the government from Perppu 1 of 2020 until further notice. The problem is that many residents fail to get the electricity subsidy because they enter the Customer ID format incorrectly on the meter and lack socialization on registering with the government. So people who do not understand technology are affected and are not the main target of this social assistance.

Based on the issues related to the implementation of electricity fee-free social assistance, it can be concluded that the government has made efforts to reduce the people's electricity burden and fulfill the eligibility of its citizens as mandated by Law Number 11 of 2009 concerning Social Welfare. However, the government's quick response to disseminate solutions to technical errors must be carried out immediately. To maintain economic stimulation amid the Covid-19 outbreak, the government should urge PLN to maintain electrical load assistance.

### 6. Evaluation of the Pre-Employment Card

Pre-Employment Card Program participants get job-readiness education and financial incentives from the government in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, as mandated by Presidential Regulation No. 36 of 2020 on Work Competency Development. Over 5.6 million people benefit from the government's provision of resources. To apply, you need to be an Indonesian citizen above the age of 18 who is not enrolled in school. If the applicant meets these requirements, the registration process is accessible via the website [www.prakerja.go.id](http://www.prakerja.go.id). Participants who complete job training are eligible for an IDR 600,000 incentive fund. The funds will be distributed after the participants have completed the five-day training period. For four months, funds are transferred directly to the first account. Participants will also receive an additional incentive of IDR 150,000 in the form of an employment survey. The issue was that some participants complained about the incentives not being distributed despite having completed the training. Complaints were also made about technical issues, specifically about certificates that did not appear on the participant's account dashboard. But at the same time, some people also abuse this opportunity and register themselves as pre-employment participants. These individuals then receive intensive assistance from the government, even though, at the same time, they already have jobs.

Based on the various obstacles encountered during the implementation of the pre-employment card incentive program, it is possible to conclude that the government has failed to achieve the primary goals of Government Regulation Number 36 of 2020 concerning the

Development of Work Competency Through the Pre-Employment Card Program. This occurred as a result of the government's failure to distribute these incentives on time.

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### 7. Evaluation of Additional Participants in the Family Hope Program

Since 2007, the Family Hope Program has been a regular Ministry of Social Affairs program. This program is based on the National Social Security System Act of 2004, Law Number 40. The government boosted the number of Family Hope Program participants from 9.2 million to 10 million during the pandemic. The most recent revisions to the Integrated Social Welfare Data and the KPM data provided by the Regional Government form the basis for this augmentation. Pregnant women and children aged 0-6 years receive IDR 250,000 per month, elementary school students receive IDR 75,000 per month, junior high school students receive IDR 125,000 per month, and high school students receive IDR 125 thousand per month. Sons with severe disabilities and program participants aged 70 and up, on the other hand, receive IDR 200,000 per month.

During the Covid-19 epidemic, the average monthly rate at which FMUs are issued varies. During the period of April 2020 through December 2020, aid will be delivered on a monthly basis in place of the more usual four monthly installments (January, April, July, and October). HIMBARA Banks will receive the assistance. The money will be distributed by PKH assistants to the participants. The problem is the inaccuracy of targeting PKH beneficiaries because the database is inaccurate. This is because the data is not updated regularly. Therefore, it was found that there were beneficiaries who had passed away, moved their domicile, married young, divorced, had not attended school, and had changed conditions, not per the criteria for the beneficiary component. There is also manipulation of data on the requirements for poverty or the presence of fictitious beneficiaries engineered by PKH Facilitators, government officials, and channeling bank officers in beneficiary areas. For example, the beneficiary has never received PKH funds for two years, and later, it was revealed that the money was withdrawn by someone who was not a beneficiary.

Based on the polemic that occurred in the implementation of the Family Hope program, it can be concluded that the government has not fully fulfilled the mandate contained in Law Number 11 of 2009 concerning Social Welfare because a lot of data manipulation was found in the field related to the implementation of the program. This resulted in many fictitious recipients of social assistance so that many people who were supposed to be beneficiaries became unnoticed by the government.

### 8. Evaluation of Staple Food Cards

Formerly known as "Non-Cash Food Assistance," this program has been active since 2017. Program 63 of the 2017 Presidential Executive Orders on Non-Cash Social Assistance Distribution serves as the basis for this initiative. However, the program's name has changed to the Cheap Staple Food Card effective 1 February 2020. The government raised the number of recipients from 15 million to 20 million as a result of the pandemic. Individuals must register with the RT/RW or ward system in order to get benefits. A registration number will be assigned to prospective beneficiaries. Beneficiaries will then be registered for a HIMBARA bank account. Participants will receive a card with a balance after completing the data verification process and registering with Bank HIMBARA. There was an increase in the value of the beneficiary's account from the beginning to the end of the pandemic.

Starting at IDR 150,000 per month and going up to IDR 200,000 per month. This supplementary balance amount is good from April 2020 through September 2020. E-Warungs that have formed relationships with the channeling bank allow aid recipients to make purchases using those monies. Some people were upset that they did not get aid, and the distribution process was not entirely flawless. UGM Social Observer Hempri Suyatna said that data validation is the root of the problem. From his observations, most of the social assistance was misdirected because the data collection process at the regional level was not yet valid. For example, residents who died are still recorded, residents who do not have a NIK are recorded, capable residents are recorded, and so on. In addition, the flow of bureaucracy is also a different problem in the distribution of this social assistance. Synchronization between stakeholders is still weak. Several assistance programs provided by the government, such as Pre-Employment Cards, BLT, life insurance and village allocation programs, are borne by different central ministries. Not to mention that there is direct essential food assistance from the President and assistance from other stakeholders, such as communities, political parties, socio-religious organizations, and companies. The problems that occurred, among others, were in Srigading Village, Sanden, and Bantul. Residents of Gokerten Hamlet, RT 039, residents could not disburse assistance from the Staple Food Cards. The balance received in the account was not up to Rp 200 thousand. As a result, the staple food card cannot be disbursed when brought to the agent.

In light of the constraints in the implementation of the Staple Food Card Program, it is possible to conclude that the government has not been able to overcome the problem of data incompatibility, causing the distribution of social assistance to be off target. Therefore, Law Number 11 of 2009 has not been fully implemented properly. If this is allowed by the government, the problem will potentially cause greater social inequality.

#### **9. Reflection on Problems: Causes of Inaccuracy in Targeting the Distribution of Covid-19 Social Assistance**

The various Covid-19 social assistance programs and the problems that occur show that the issues are still the same. This problem was primarily initiated by the many regulations and regulations issued by the government, which were not in harmony and line with society, creating new issues during a panicked society due to the COVID-19 outbreak. Since the community is expected to follow government regulations, but the Central Government and Regional Government have conflicting policies and procedures, the citizens are unsure about how they should behave. The same policy should be released by both the federal and regional governments, through the same channel, at the same time, to avoid public confusion and unrest. Only one door needs to be opened at one time to clear up the confusion around the distribution of social services. As long as there is more than one possible entry point and more than one possible epoch, the resulting perspective will be unique and unrepeatable. Since we're in a crisis right now and not everyone can be patient. As a result, society is in disarray as many people vent their frustrations. Another issue is that incomplete information might be used to fraudulently grant social benefits to those who do not qualify. Several other residents of the same neighborhood likewise received government social aid twice, whereas their neighbors did not receive any such support at all (Lu et al., 2020).

However, the government can undertake many steps to improve the implementation of Covid-19 social aid distribution. The first step the government should take is to think about

creating a way for those who have been affected and need help to voluntarily disclose it. The public sector can also work with nonprofits and businesses to aid the most marginalized citizens. Second, the supply side, like domestic food production, needs to be prioritized in terms of quantity and quality. Third, in light of current circumstances, the requirements for receiving social assistance should be relaxed. Even if it is necessary, social assistance is made unconditional. Fourth, clear and consistent public communication is required to ensure that the public understands the assistance and mechanism in place. Fifth, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Coordinating Ministry for the Economy, the Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture, the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing, and the Regional Government are in charge of implementing social assistance programs; synergy between Ministries and Institutions (K/L) is required. Despite the fact that a budget and social assistance have been allocated, communication, cooperation, and multi-stakeholder coordination are critical to the success of this program (Unruh et al., 2022).

## E. CONCLUSION

This study found that many problems occurred in the distribution of social assistance from the government during the pandemic. Incomplete data and the difficulty of regulations and mechanisms for ordinary people initiated this problem. This then caused many challenges in implementing the process of channeling aid into the hands of the community. Some people who should be able to get this assistance to have difficulty or do not receive assistance at all. At the same time, some government officials and the public used this assistance for their benefit. Some governments provide social assistance to their supporters, while those known not to have voted for them during elections are not provided social assistance. Then there were also cases where the government included the names of their families as beneficiaries so that even if they were able, government assistance would still be received by their families. On the community side, many people take advantage of assistance from pre-employment cards. Even though they already have stable jobs, these individuals still register themselves to receive assistance later. In addition, some people are economically no longer included in the party that deserves assistance. However, they do not report themselves to the government, so when social assistance is provided to the community, these parties are still registered and receive assistance from the government.

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