



Instrumentalizing Religious Symbolism in Electoral Politics: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Electoral Legitimacy and Post-Election Corruption in Indonesia

Agus Machfud Fauzi,^{1*} Iffatin Nur,² Novi Fitia Maliha,³ Ahmad Ridwan,⁴ Hazim⁵

^{1,4} Faculty of Social Sciences and Politics, Universitas Negeri Surabaya, Indonesia

² Faculty of Sharia and Law, Universitas Islam Negeri Sayyid Ali
Rahmatullah Tulungagung, Indonesia

³ Faculty of Sharia, Universitas Islam Negeri Kiai Ageng Muhammad
Besari, Ponorogo, Indonesia

⁵ Faculty of Humanities, University of Hamburg, Germany

*Corresponding Author: agusmfauzi@unesa.ac.id

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.21154/justicia.v23i2.13181>

Received: Jan 18, 2026

Revised: June 30, 2026

Accepted: July 20, 2026

Abstract: This study analyzes the paradox between the use of religious symbolism in local election campaigns in Indonesia in 2024 and the corruption committed by several Muslim local leaders after their election. The study employs a qualitative design that combines a normative-juridical approach with comparative socio-political analysis through case studies of five regional heads in East Kolaka, Ponorogo, Central Lampung, Bekasi, and Riau who were arrested by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in 2025. Normative data were obtained from the literature on *siyāsa shar‘iyya*, anti-corruption laws and regulations, and official KPK documents. In contrast, empirical data were analyzed using Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic capital and Max Weber’s theory of charismatic authority. The results indicate that religious symbolism plays an effective role in building electoral legitimacy but does not translate into ethical commitment in governance. Religious identity functions more as political capital than as a foundation for public integrity. These findings suggest that the combination of the instrumentalization of religious symbols and high electoral costs creates incentives for post-election rent-seeking. In practical terms, this study recommends strengthening political integrity through electoral financing reform, ethical oversight of public officials, and the development of leadership indicators that emphasize integrity alongside religious symbolism.

Keywords: Religious symbolism; political corruption; regional head elections; public integrity.

Abstrak: Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis paradoks antara penggunaan simbolisme keagamaan dalam kampanye pemilihan kepala daerah di Indonesia pada 2024 dan praktik korupsi yang dilakukan oleh sejumlah kepala daerah Muslim setelah terpilih. Penelitian menggunakan desain kualitatif dengan memadukan pendekatan normatif-yuridis dan analisis sosio-politik komparatif melalui studi kasus terhadap lima kepala daerah di Kolaka Timur, Ponorogo, Lampung Tengah, Bekasi, dan Riau yang ditangkap Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) pada tahun 2025. Data normatif diperoleh dari literatur *siyāsah syar'iyah*, peraturan perundang-undangan antikorupsi, dan dokumen resmi KPK, sedangkan data empiris dianalisis menggunakan konsep modal simbolik Pierre Bourdieu dan teori otoritas karismatik Max Weber. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa simbolisme keagamaan berperan efektif dalam membangun legitimasi elektoral, tetapi tidak bertransformasi menjadi komitmen etis dalam penyelenggaraan pemerintahan. Identitas keagamaan lebih berfungsi sebagai modal politik daripada sebagai landasan integritas publik. Temuan ini menunjukkan bahwa kombinasi antara instrumentalisasi simbol agama dan tingginya biaya politik elektoral menciptakan insentif bagi praktik *rent-seeking* pascapemilihan. Secara praktis, penelitian ini merekomendasikan penguatan integritas politik melalui reformasi pembiayaan pemilu, pengawasan etika pejabat publik, serta pengembangan indikator kepemimpinan yang menekankan rekam jejak integritas di samping simbolisme keagamaan.

Kata kunci: simbolisme agama; korupsi politik; pemilihan kepala daerah; integritas publik.



Copyright: © 2026 by author (s). This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/).

Introduction

The relationship between religious symbolism and electoral politics is one of the most significant phenomena¹ in terms of analysis and empirical research in contemporary democracies with a majority Muslim population.² In societies where Islam is deeply embedded in identity, social norms, and political culture, candidates for public office often employ Islamic symbols, such as religious attire, Quranic rhetoric, public displays of piety, and endorsements from prominent religious figures, to establish moral legitimacy and foster voter

¹ Adinda Dwi Fitriyanti and Nirmala Anggur Aulia, "Shalawatan as the Head Election Campaign Website for Region Karangpoh Village, Menganti, Gresik," *Journal of Religion, Local Politics, and Law* 1, no. 4 (October 2025): 296–308, <https://doi.org/10.64595/jrlpl.v1n4.p309-319>.

² Agus Machfud Fauzi et al., "Santri Community, Charisma, and the Contrast Political Agency: Electoral Victory and Defeat in Jombang and Mojokerto, Indonesia," *Ascarya: Journal of Islamic Science, Culture, and Social Studies* 5, no. 2 (December 2025): 224–35, <https://doi.org/10.53754/xzzh8v16>.

trust.³ This practice is no coincidence; religious symbolism serves as a political tool in general elections within Muslim-majority regions. It compels candidates to demonstrate their credibility, morality, and alignment with community values, thereby transforming symbolic piety into tangible electoral advantage.⁴ This phenomenon becomes particularly significant when political victories achieved through religious symbolism clash with post-election behaviors, such as corruption, that violate both the law and Islamic morality. This contradiction raises crucial questions regarding the interrelationship between symbolic religious identity, a system of governance that substantively upholds ethics, and the integrity of political leadership within a Muslim-majority society.⁵ The urgency of this research: the persistence of corruption among elected regional heads in the world's largest Muslim-majority democracy, under a direct regional head election system (*pilkada langsung*).⁶ This paradox of religious symbolism and post-election.⁷

Major scholarly debates about religiosity, religious symbolism, and corruption can be outlined below. The relationship between religiosity, religious symbolism, and corruption reveals significant theoretical tensions that remain unresolved. A foundational strand of this debate argues that religiosity does not automatically reduce corruption.⁸ This position is supported by cross-national empirical evidence demonstrating that the relationship between religion and corruption is mediated by institutional

³ Siti Nur Syifa, Muhammad Torieq Abdillah, and Fadil Sj, "The Legal Responsibility of the General Elections Commission in the 2024 Election Data Leak: Integration of Personal Data Protection Laws and the Principle of *Sadd al-Dharī'at*," *Justicia Islamica* 22, no. 1 (July 2025): 185–210, <https://doi.org/10.21154/justicia.v22i1.10390>.

⁴ Sukardi Sukardi, Muhammad Adib Alfarisi, and Riyani Riyani, "Systems of Government in Islamic Countries: The Dynamics of Sharia Law from the Prophetic Period to the Modern Era," *Justicia Islamica* 21, no. 2 (November 2024): 291–312, <https://doi.org/10.21154/justicia.v21i2.8465>.

⁵ Syahrul Anwar, Mohd Anuar Ramli, and Muhammad Nuruddien, "Autonomy and Islamic Criminal Law Enforcement in Creating Social Order in Aceh Region," *De Jure: Jurnal Hukum Dan Syar'iah* 17, no. 2 (September 2025): 438–57, <https://doi.org/10.18860/j-fsh.v17i2.32771>.

⁶ Rida Srihadiastuti and Mahjus Ekananda, "Corruption, Public Debt, Political Years, and Economic Growth in Democratic Developing Countries," *Integritas: Jurnal Antikorupsi* 10, no. 2 (February 2025): 197–210, <https://doi.org/10.32697/integritas.v10i2.1264>.

⁷ Abdul Karim et al., "Altruistic Works, Religion, and Corruption: Kiai s' Leadership to Shape Anti-Corruption Values in Pesantren," *Cogent Social Sciences* 9, no. 1 (December 2023): 2238968, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2023.2238968>.

⁸ Nur Khoirin and Mahfudz Junaedi, "Religious Inconsistency on Corruption Behaviour among Muslim Politicians in Indonesia," *HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies* 78, no. 4 (June 2022), <https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v78i1.7361>.

structures, democratic quality, and the specific religious denomination under examination, including Sunni Islam, which shows complex and sometimes counterintuitive relationships with corruption levels.⁹ However, a contrasting strand of the literature maintains that Islamic political ethics, grounded in the principles of *amanah* (trustworthiness), *'adl* (justice), and *hisbah* (moral accountability), provides a normatively robust framework for anti-corruption leadership when genuinely internalized, and that religiously grounded leadership.

The selection of this theme is based on the fact that the 2024 simultaneous regional head elections in Indonesia constitute a compelling subject for comprehensive analysis to investigate certain paradoxes. The five figures examined in this study, Abdul Azis (Regent of East Kolaka), Sugiri Sancoko (Regent of Ponorogo), Ardito Wijaya (Regent of Central Lampung), Ade Kuswara Kunang (Regent of Bekasi), and Abdul Wahid (Governor of Riau), were elected in November 2024 following campaigns that consistently employed Islamic symbolism as a legitimation strategy. Within four to thirteen months of their inauguration, all five were arrested by Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi*, KPK) on charges of bribery, gratification, and abuse of authority, with arrests occurring between August and December 2025.¹⁰ These five cases form part of a broader institutional record that the KPK handled throughout 2025.¹¹ The rationale for selecting Indonesia as the research context is that its high-cost electoral system structurally incentivizes post-victory corruption and rent extraction.¹²

⁹ Yaron Zelekha and Gil Avnimelech, "Cultural and Personal Channels between Religion, Religiosity, and Corruption," *Heliyon* 9, no. 6 (June 2023): e16882, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e16882>.

¹⁰ Adrial Akbar, "KPK Tangani 439 Perkara Sepanjang Tahun 2025, 69 Masih Penyelidikan," *detik.com*, accessed December 2025, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-8272780/kpk-tangani-439-perkara-sepanjang-tahun-2025-69-masih-penyelidikan>.

¹¹ Andry Novelino, "Daftar Kepala Daerah Hingga Anggota Kabinet Tersangkut Korupsi Di 2025," *CNN Indonesia*, accessed December 2025, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20251224144827-12-1310346/daftar-kepala-daerah-hingga-anggota-kabinet-tersangkut-korupsi-di-2025>.

¹² Arif Rahman Hakim and Putro Samudro, "State Religion and Corruption in Islamic Countries: An Empirical Examination," *Muslim Business and Economics Review* 4, no. 2 (December 2025): 256–77, <https://doi.org/10.56529/mber.v4i2.379>.

The literature review focuses on and relates to the research object, collectively justifying the present study's approach.¹³ Research on the relationship between religious identity and political corruption in Muslim-majority countries has established that state religion and Islamic affiliation do not automatically produce lower corruption levels.¹⁴ Studies examining religious inconsistency and corrupt behavior among Muslim politicians in Indonesia have documented the gap between publicly professed Islamic values and actual governance conduct.¹⁵ Bibliometric analyses of the corruption-religion research landscape have confirmed that this field is rapidly expanding but remains fragmented across disciplinary boundaries.¹⁶ Research on the role of political dramaturgy and front-stage versus back-stage behavior in electoral politics has shown that political actors routinely separate their public moral performance from their private conduct.¹⁷ Studies on the ethics and behavior of Islamic politics have affirmed that the principles of *amanah*, *'adl*, and *hisbah* constitute a normatively coherent framework for evaluating political leadership.¹⁸ Other research has examined perceptions of religiosity and corruption in public organizations in Malaysia, and has found a negative relationship between local religions (Buddhism, Taoism) and corruption at the regional level in China.¹⁹ Further research has yielded findings across 70

¹³ Umarwan Sutopo, Achmad Hasan Basri, and Hilman Rosyidi, "Presidential Threshold in The 2024 Presidential Elections: Implications for The Benefits of Democracy In Indonesia," *Justicia Islamica* 21, no. 1 (June 2024): 155–78, <https://doi.org/10.21154/justicia.v21i1.7577>.

¹⁴ Udi Sommer, Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom, and Gizem Arikan, "Does Faith Limit Immorality? The Politics of Religion and Corruption," *Democratization* 20, no. 2 (March 2013): 287–309, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.650914>.

¹⁵ Rijal Ulil Abshar, and Gesit Yudha, "Ethics and Behavior of Islamic Politics," *Jurnal Tapis: Jurnal Teropong Aspirasi Politik Islam* 21, no. 1 (June 2025): 1–24, <https://doi.org/10.24042/wfzr8v37>.

¹⁶ Salahudin et al., "Research Theme Mapping and Future Directions on Corruption and Religion: A Bibliometric Analysis," *Frontiers in Sociology* 10 (March 2025): 1502700, <https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2025.1502700>.

¹⁷ Omer Gokcekus and Tufan Ekici, Religion, Religiosity, and Corruption. *Review of Religious Research*, 62(4), 563–581. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13644-020-00421-2> Omer Gokcekus and Tufan Ekici, "Religion, Religiosity, and Corruption," *Review of Religious Research* 62, no. 4 (December 2020): 563–81, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13644-020-00421-2>.

¹⁸ Nadirsah Hawari, Agustam Agustam, and Muntaha Artalim, "The Role Of Religious Study Groups In Fostering Anti-Corruption Behavior and Its Implications for Local Democratic Practices In Metro City," *Akademika: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 28, no. 1 (June 2023): 57–70, <https://doi.org/10.32332/akademika.v28i1.6499>.

¹⁹ Xixiong Xu et al., "Does Religion Matter to Corruption? Evidence from China," *China Economic Review* 42 (February 2017): 34–49, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2016.11.005>; Syah Awaluddin et al.,

countries demonstrating a correlation between religiosity and broader corruption globally.²⁰ In North America and Europe, religion is systematically related to levels of corruption, integration of sociological theory, and Islamic law.²¹ The literature demonstrates how religious symbolism operates as symbolic capital in electoral politics. It confirms the empirical relevance and the absence of an analytical framework to constrain post-election corruption.²²

The research gap identified across the foregoing literature is threefold and directly motivates the novelty and objectives of this study. First, while Pierre Bourdieu's theory of symbolic capital and Max Weber's concept of charismatic authority have each been invoked in studies of religious politics, no existing study has systematically synthesized these two frameworks as a unified analytical lens to explain the conversion of religious symbolism into electoral victory and its subsequent decoupling from ethical governance in the Indonesian regional election context.²³ Secondly, normative Islamic legal research has addressed the moral responsibility of Muslim political leaders within the framework of *siyāsa shar'iyā*. Yet, it has not consistently applied this to cases of post-election corruption involving leaders who explicitly championed campaigns based on Islamic identity. This creates a significant gap between normative Islamic political theory and sociological analysis.²⁴ Third, the existing literature on corruption in Indonesian regional elections

"Between Worship and Bribery: Charity in the Shadow of Electoral Politics," *De Jure: Jurnal Hukum Dan Syar'iah* 17, no. 1 (June 2025): 255–376, <https://doi.org/10.18860/j-fsh.v17i1.32615>.

²⁰ Yaron Zelekha and Gil Avnimelech, "Cultural and Personal Channels between Religion, Religiosity, and Corruption," *Heliyon* 9, no. 6 (June 2023): e16882, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e16882>.

²¹ Muhammad Sibawaihi, Devika Rosa Guspita, and Badriyah Badriyah, "Islamic Legal Strategies in Indonesian Contexts to Combat Cybercrime and the Spread of Illegal Data Dissemination," *Justicia Islamica* 21, no. 2 (November 2024): 357–76, <https://doi.org/10.21154/justicia.v21i2.9587>.

²² nadirsah Hawari, Agustam Agustam, and Muntaha Artalim, "The Role of Religious Study Groups In Fostering Anti-Corruption Behavior and Its Implications For Local Democratic Practices In Metro City," *Akademika: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 28, no. 1 (June 2023): 57–70, <https://doi.org/10.32332/akademika.v28i1.6499>.

²³ Asoke Kumar Saha et al., "Perception of Corruption across Gender, Religion, and Socioeconomic Status," *Humanitas: Indonesian Psychological Journal*, August 28, 2023, 129–35, <https://doi.org/10.26555/humanitas.v20i2.120>; Auradian Marta et al., "The Crisis of Democratic Governance in Contemporary Indonesia," *Jurnal Ilmiah Peuradeun* 8, no. 1 (January 2020): 109–28, <https://doi.org/10.26811/peuradeun.v8i1.368>.

²⁴ Nathanael Gratias Sumaktoyo and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, "Can Religion Save Corrupt Politicians? Evidence from Indonesia," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 34, no. 1 (February 2022): edab029, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edab029>.

has not adequately integrated the structural analysis of high-cost electoral politics with the symbolic analysis of religious identity mobilization. This study addresses all three gaps through a qualitative, comparative case study of the five aforementioned regional heads, employing an integrated juridical-normative and socio-political methodology.²⁵

The juridical-normative approach in this study is operationalized through a systematic analysis of three complementary normative bodies. First, classical and contemporary texts of *siyāsa shar'īyya* are examined to establish standards for Muslim leadership valid under Islamic law, encompassing principles such as public trust (*amanah*), justice, and accountability. Second, Indonesian anti-corruption legislation, specifically Law No. 31 of 1999 in conjunction with Law No. 20 of 2001 concerning the Eradication of Corruption, is analyzed to identify the elements of the offense relevant to the post-election conduct of the five research subjects. Third, official documents from the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), including indictments, arrest records, and press releases, serve as primary data sources for reconstructing the legal facts of each case.²⁶ These three layers of normative analysis are structured sequentially, moving from Islamic standards to positive legal standards²⁷ and finally to empirical case facts, thereby yielding a coherent evaluation of the disparity between symbolic-religious legitimacy and documented corrupt behavior.²⁸

The sociopolitical approach was operationalized through a comparative multiple-case study design involving five elected regional heads as units of

²⁵ Agus Machfud Fauzi et al., *Politicisation of Agrarian Legal Conflict as Political Capital: A Fiqh Siyasah Perspective*, (Malang) 18, no. 1 (June): 126–49, <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.18860/j-fsh.v18i1.41410>.

²⁶ M. Rizal Qosim et al., “The Politicization of Religion and Law Enforcement in Indonesia’s Democratic Elections: An Islamic Legal Perspective,” *Al-Manahij: Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam*, December 19, 2025, 313–34, <https://doi.org/10.24090/mnh.v19i2.15244>; Kustiawan et al., “Al-Mawardi’s Thoughts and Its Relevance to Contemporary Political Systems,” *Jurnal Tapis : Jurnal Teropong Aspirasi Politik Islam* 21, no. 2 (December 2025): 127–54, <https://doi.org/10.24042/tps.v22i2.28980>.

²⁷ Salah Ud Din, Sharifah Hayaati Syed Ismail, and Raja Hisyamudin Raja Sulong, “Combating Corruption Based on Al-Siyasah al-Syar’iyyah Perspective: A Literature Review,” *International Journal of Ethics and Systems* 40, no. 4 (December 2024): 776–807, <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOES-12-2022-0312>.

²⁸ Am Fauzi et al., “Maintaining Identity Political Culture In Indonesia,” *Journal of Physics: Conference Series* 953 (January 2018): 012185, <https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/953/1/012185>.

analysis.²⁹ Case selection was purposive, based on four explicit criteria: (a) candidates publicly displayed Islamic symbols during their campaigns—including religious attire, Islamic-themed slogans, and associations with religious scholars (*ulema*); (b) candidates won the 2024 regional election; (c) the regional heads were officially implicated in corruption cases handled by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK); and (d) the cases received significant, verifiable media coverage. Data collection involved a documentary study of digital campaign materials, speech recordings, mass media reports, and KPK law enforcement documents. All data were analyzed using a two-stage thematic content analysis: the first stage involved deductive coding based on Bourdieu's theory of symbolic capital and Weber's concept of charismatic authority, while the second stage employed inductive coding to capture patterns emerging from the data.³⁰ Two members of the research team cross-checked both coding stages to ensure inter-rater reliability.

The Perspective of Islamic Law and Political Sociology Theory on Religious Symbols in Political Campaigns

This study employs a qualitative research design integrating two methodological strands, operationalized in complementary and sequential ways.³¹ The first strand is a juridical-normative approach, which is used to examine the normative standards governing Muslim political leadership under Islamic law, specifically the principles of *siyāsa shar'iyya*, and to evaluate the post-election conduct of the five research subjects against those standards.³² This approach is operationalized through systematic analysis of primary and secondary legal materials, including classical and contemporary Islamic

²⁹ Francine Van Den Brandeler, "Methodology," in *Scalar Mismatches in Metropolitan Water Governance*, by Francine Van Den Brandeler, Water Governance - Concepts, Methods, and Practice (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022), 29–46, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08061-6_2.

³⁰ Mathieu Marlier et al., "Capacity Building through Cross-Sector Partnerships: A Multiple Case Study of a Sport Program in Disadvantaged Communities in Belgium," *BMC Public Health* 15, no. 1 (December 2015): 1306, <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-015-2605-5>.

³¹ Eunice K. Assem-Erhaze and Mandy M. Archibald, "Reimagining Inquiry: A Transformative Integration of Mixed Methods Action Research and Qualitatively Driven Designs in Disability Research Contexts," *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, November 25, 2025, 15586898251398262, <https://doi.org/10.1177/15586898251398262>.

³² Mardalena Hanifah and Muhammad Adil, "Legal Culture and Law Enforcement in Indonesia: A Normative Juridical Perspective," *Eduvest - Journal of Universal Studies* 5, no. 6 (June 2025): 6332–41, <https://doi.org/10.59188/eduvest.v5i6.49987>.

jurisprudential texts, Indonesian statutory law (Law No. 31 of 1999 and Law No. 20 of 2001 concerning Corruption Eradication), and official documentation from the KPK about the five corruption cases under study.³³ The second strand is a socio-political approach, operationalized through a comparative multiple case study design focused on five regional heads in Indonesia who prominently mobilized Islamic symbolism during their 2024 election campaigns and were subsequently arrested by the KPK on corruption charges between August and December 2025. Four clear criteria were used to select these cases: (a) the candidates openly employed Islamic symbols during their campaigns—including religious attire, Islamic slogans, and associations with religious figures; (b) the candidates won the 2024 regional elections; (c) the cases received significant and credible media coverage indicating that the candidates were implicated in corruption cases handled by the KPK; and (d) this selection strategy was illustrative and purposive, rather than intended to be statistically representative of the population. The objective is to identify socio-legal patterns and structural dynamics rather than to generalize across all political actors.³⁴ Documentary data, including campaign materials, media reports, and KPK enforcement records, were analyzed through thematic content analysis, systematically coding for patterns of religious symbol deployment, electoral legitimation strategies, and post-election corrupt conduct. The juridical-normative analysis and socio-political case analysis are then synthesized to produce an integrated assessment of the paradox between symbolic religious legitimacy and corrupt governance.

This study integrates two sociological theories, Pierre Bourdieu's concept of symbolic capital and Max Weber's concept of charismatic authority, as complementary analytical lenses that together explain both the electoral effectiveness of religious symbolism and its structural failure to constrain post-election corrupt conduct.³⁵

³³ Tunggal Ansari Setia Negara, "Normative Legal Research in Indonesia: Its Origins and Approaches," *Audito Comparative Law Journal (ACLJ)* 4, no. 1 (February 2023): 1–9, <https://doi.org/10.22219/aclj.v4i1.24855>.

³⁴ Naomi Creutzfeldt, Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie, eds., *Routledge Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory and Methods*, Routledge Handbooks (London New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020).

³⁵ C. Turner, "Modernity and Politics in the Work of Max Weber," *Choice Reviews Online* 30, no. 11 (July 1993): 30-6462-30-6462, <https://doi.org/10.5860/CHOICE.30-6462>.

These frameworks are not applied descriptively but are operationalized as analytical instruments directly connected to the research problem and the five cases under examination.³⁶ From Bourdieu's perspective, religious symbolism in electoral campaigns functions as symbolic capital: a socially recognized resource that is convertible into political capital, specifically electoral support, within a Muslim-majority political field.³⁷ Three analytically distinct stages, symbol production, social legitimation, and conversion into political support, through which candidates transform markers of Islamic identity into measurable electoral gains.³⁸ It is also important to note that Bourdieu's framework explains why symbolic capital, in itself, cannot generate ethical behavior. This is because symbolic capital operates through the mechanism of "misrecognition," wherein society accepts moral claims without critically examining their ethical foundations. This suggests that voters may view religious symbols as indicators of a person's fitness to lead, without questioning whether the candidate has genuinely internalized the principles those symbols represent.³⁹ Extensions of Bourdieu's framework through the concepts of spiritual capital and sacred capital further illuminate how religious competence and sanctity function as exchangeable resources within the political field, subject to the same logic of accumulation and conversion as other forms of capital.⁴⁰ Applied to the five cases in this study, the Bourdieusian framework explains how each regional head successfully converted Islamic symbolic capital into electoral victory while remaining

³⁶ Khulida Kirana Yahya et al., "The Perception of Gen Y on Organizational Culture, Religiosity and Corruption in Malaysian Public Organizations," *Procedia Economics and Finance* 31 (2015): 251–61, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671\(15\)01227-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(15)01227-7); Salahudin et al., "Research Theme Mapping and Future Directions on Corruption and Religion: A Bibliometric Analysis," *Frontiers in Sociology* 10 (March 2025), <https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2025.1502700>.

³⁷ Omer Gokcekus and Tufan Ekici, "Religion, Religiosity, and Corruption," *Review of Religious Research* 62, no. 4 (December 2020): 563–81, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13644-020-00421-2>.

³⁸ Yaron Zelekha and Gil Avnimelech, "Cultural and Personal Channels between Religion, Religiosity, and Corruption," *Heliyon* 9, no. 6 (June 2023): e16882, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e16882>.

³⁹ Nadirsah Hawari, Agustam Agustam, and Muntaha Artalim, "The Role Of Religious Study Groups In Fostering Anti-Corruption Behavior And Its Implications For Local Democratic Practices In Metro City," *Akademika: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 28, no. 1 (June 2023): 57–70, <https://doi.org/10.32332/akademika.v28i1.6499>.

⁴⁰ Waled Younes E. Alazzabi, Hasri Mustafa, and Ahmed Razman Abdul Latiff, "Corruption and Control from the Perspective of Islam," *Journal of Financial Crime* 27, no. 2 (January 2020): 355–68, <https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-02-2019-0020>.

structurally unconstrained by the ethical content of the symbols mobilized.⁴¹ Weber's concept of charismatic authority⁴² complements Bourdieu's framework by explaining the personalized, affect-laden dimension of religious legitimacy in electoral politics.⁴³ Charismatic authority in Muslim-majority electoral contexts derives from social recognition of a leader's exceptional moral qualities rather than from legal or institutional mandate. Public displays of piety, religious attire, and association with *ulema* function as the primary vehicles through which charismatic legitimacy is constructed and communicated to voters.⁴⁴ Contemporary research has shown that this Weberian charismatic authority is increasingly produced through strategic performance, termed charismatic performance, in which religious symbols and moral rhetoric are mobilized instrumentally to generate electoral support rather than as expressions of genuine ethical commitment.⁴⁵ The analytical significance of Weber's framework for this study lies in its explanation of why charismatic religious legitimacy tends to displace rather than reinforce rational-legal accountability: when public trust is anchored in personal religious charisma rather than in institutional oversight mechanisms, the conditions for abuse of authority are structurally reproduced even among

⁴¹ Dina El-Bassiouny et al., "To Blow or Not to Blow the Whistle? An Islamic Framework," *Journal of Business Ethics* 187, no. 2 (October 2023): 385–404, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-022-05274-z>; Adhing Tedhalosa et al., "Bridging Justice Systems: Asset Confiscation in Anti-Corruption Law and Islamic Jurisprudence," *Asy-Syir'ah: Jurnal Ilmu Syari'ah Dan Hukum* 59, no. 1 (October 2025): 112–30, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajish.v59i1.1611>.

⁴² Benjamin Moffitt and Simon Tormey, "Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatization and Political Style," *Political Studies* 62, no. 2 (June 2014): 381–97, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12032>; Nathanael Gratiyas Sumaktoyo and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, "Can Religion Save Corrupt Politicians? Evidence from Indonesia," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 34, no. 1 (March 2022): edab029, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edab029>.

⁴³ Salah Ud Din, Sharifah Hayaati Syed Ismail, and Raja Hisyamudin Raja Sulong, "Combating Corruption Based on Al-Siyasah al-Syar'iyah Perspective: A Literature Review," *International Journal of Ethics and Systems* 40, no. 4 (December 2024): 776–807, <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOES-12-2022-0312>.

⁴⁴ Idrus Ruslan Ruslan, Rijal Ulil Abshar, and Gesit Yudha, "Ethics and Behavior of Islamic Politics," *Jurnal Tapis: Jurnal Teropong Aspirasi Politik Islam* 21, no. 1 (June 2025): 1–24, <https://doi.org/10.24042/wfzr8v37>; Roy Riady et al., "Reformulating the Reversal of the Burden of Proof in Corruption Cases: Integrating Positive Law and Islamic Legal Principles," *Nurani: Jurnal Kajian Syari'ah Dan Masyarakat* 25, no. 2 (October 2025): 514–28, <https://doi.org/10.19109/nurani.v25i2.30483>.

⁴⁵ Eko Sudarmanto et al., "Maqashid Sharia as a Framework for Innovation in Corruption Prevention," *International Journal of Islamic Thought and Humanities* 4, no. 1 (March 2025): 38–50, <https://doi.org/10.54298/ijith.v4i1.313>.

leaders who carry strong moral legitimacy.⁴⁶ Applied to the five cases, Weber's framework accounts for the pattern by which each regional head's religious charisma generated electoral victory while simultaneously reducing public demands for institutional accountability. This dynamic created the structural opportunity for post-election corruption.⁴⁷

The integration of these two frameworks with the Islamic juridical, normative analysis of *siyāsa shar'iyya* constitutes the study's core theoretical contribution: Bourdieu explains the conversion mechanism, Weber explains the legitimacy-accountability displacement, and Islamic political ethics, grounded in *amanah*, *'adl*, and *hisbah*, provides the normative evaluative standard against which the post-election conduct of the five subjects is assessed.⁴⁸ Together, these three analytical strands form a unified framework for explaining why the paradox of religious symbolism and electoral corruption is not a contingent individual failure but a structurally reproduced outcome of Indonesia's regional electoral system.⁴⁹

Religious Symbolism and Electoral Victory in the 2024 Regional Elections for Five Regional Head Candidates

Electoral victories exemplify the mechanism by which religious symbols function as Bourdieu's symbolic capital and construct Weber's charismatic authority. Each candidate deployed Islamic signifiers, *peci*, *koko* shirts, sarongs, pesantren visits, and rhetoric invoking *amanah*, *barakah*, and divine

⁴⁶ Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984), https://monoskop.org/images/e/e0/Pierre_Bourdieu_Distinction_A_Social_Critique_of_the_Judgement_of_Taste_1984.pdf.

⁴⁷ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (United States of America: Oxford University Press, New York Inc., 1947), https://ia804503.us.archive.org/32/items/weber-max-the-theory-of-social-and-economic-organization-1947_202106/Weber; David Swartz, "Bridging the Study of Culture and Religion: Pierre Bourdieu's Political Economy of Symbolic Power," *Sociology of Religion* 57, no. 1 (March 1996): 71–85, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3712005>.

⁴⁸ Hugh Urban, "Sacred Capital: Pierre Bourdieu and the Study of Religion," *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 15, no. 4 (2003): 354–89, <https://doi.org/10.1163/157006803322697416>.

⁴⁹ Gitte Sommer Harrits, "Political Power as Symbolic Capital and Symbolic Violence," *Journal of Political Power* 4, no. 2 (August 2011): 237–58, <https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2011.589178>; Andrew M. McKinnon, Marta Trzebiatowska, and Christopher Craig Brittain, "Bourdieu, Capital, and Conflict in a Religious Field: The Case of the 'Homosexuality' Conflict in the Anglican Communion," *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 26, no. 3 (October 2011): 355–70, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537903.2011.616033>.

justice, that operated as convertible capital within the electoral field.⁵⁰ Campaign attire is the most visible symbol, ranging from famous religious models to simple ones. All five candidates leveraged social media platforms, *Instagram*, *Facebook*, and *TikTok*, to stage and circulate religious performances, posting prayer rituals, *pesantren* visits, attendance at religious events, and Islamic rhetoric as a form of digital piety that extended their moral persona beyond physical campaign spaces. By viewing these actions as genuine moral commitments rather than mere strategic maneuvers, they can generate legitimacy that translates into political support. Candidates devised these measures to align their symbolic repertoires with the dominant religious habitus. This practice clearly illustrates Bourdieu's concept of symbolic capital within a specific context. Abdul Azis (East Kolaka) adopted Islamic attire, cultivated ties with local religious figures, and emphasized the narrative of *amanah* (integrity/responsibility). Sugiri Sancoko (Ponorogo) organized public religious events and employed Islamic-inflected campaign language on social media; Ardito Wijaya (Central Lampung) demonstrated a moral commitment to anti-corruption while forging connections with Islamic organizations; Ade Kuswara Kunang (Bekasi) displayed personal religiosity balanced with rhetoric regarding clean leadership; and Abdul Wahid (Riau) highlighted a Malay-Islamic identity through narratives of trust and justice rooted in local cultural identity. These variations demonstrate strategic adaptation, as candidates recognized the need to tailor their symbolic capital to their respective specific religious and cultural environments. The differentiation of symbolic strategies across regions underscores that electoral success depends on the candidate's capacity to align visible religious performance with locally dominant values.⁵¹

The five candidates' ties to Islamic organizations, NU, Muhammadiyah, and *pesantren* networks, and endorsements from *kiai* and *ulema* functioned as institutional symbolic capital, operating through a mechanism of legitimacy transfer: the moral authority amassed by religious institutions, which is

⁵⁰ Amir Mahmud and Dewien Nabelah Agustin, "The Influence of 'Santri Identification' on the Choice of Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates Based on Religion in the 2024 Presidential Election," *Journal of Religion, Local Politics, and Law* 1, no. 2 (July 2025): 130–43, <https://doi.org/10.64595/jrlpl.261>.


⁵¹ Agus Machfud Fauzi, Moh Mudzakir, and Mohamed Omar Abdulrahim, "Social Conflict In Contestation of Indonesia Election," *The Journal of Society and Media* 3, no. 2 (October 2019): 159, <https://doi.org/10.26740/jsm.v3n2.p159-177>.

symbolically transferred to the candidates. This endorsement can bolster a candidate's charismatic image while simultaneously providing the organizational mobilization infrastructure that enables networks of religious figures to act as conduits for converting religious influence into electoral support. Drawing on Bourdieu's conceptual framework, religious institutional capital, accumulated over years within the religious sphere through teaching, ritual leadership, and community service, is converted into political capital that operates in the electoral arena through mechanisms of endorsement and association. Securing the backing of a *kiai* (Islamic religious leader) serves as more than just a mark of a candidate's piety; it also reactivates pre-existing networks of trust and deference. Such support transforms the candidate from a mere political actor into a focal point within the broader ecosystem of religious institutions, where the symbolic capital they have garnered can be leveraged to secure electoral gains.

In addition to employing religious symbols, campaigning candidates have made anti-corruption commitments central to their campaigns for the 2024 regional head elections. This issue was also addressed during the candidate debates.⁵² To reinforce their anti-corruption stance, the five candidates employed Islamic moral language—such as *amanah* (trustworthiness), clean leadership, transparency, and justice. In doing so, they bolstered their symbolic attributes, thereby crafting a complex moral image that resonated with voters. These promises were not concrete policy commitments backed by clear mechanisms or accountability structures; rather, they served as a symbolic device merging religious identity with the rhetoric of ethical governance. Ultimately, voters perceived the candidates' displays of religiosity as a guarantee of future integrity.

⁵² Sellametha Alike Permata Gunaeri and Najwa Fadhilatul Khusna, "The Influence of Public Debate on Political Awareness and Voter Rationality in the Rembang Regional Election," *Journal of Religion, Local Politics, and Law* 1, no. 2 (July 2025): 103–13, <https://doi.org/10.64595/jrpl.200>.


Figure 1. Religious Symbolism (Clothing, Language, Social Media, and Religious Relations)



Source: Authors, 2026

The figure illustrates how religious symbols can influence the victory of regional head candidates in the 2024 regional elections (five candidates). Essentially, there are three main components. First, religiosity is the initial factor. When the public or voters see candidates strongly embodying religious symbols (for example, through clothing, language, or social media posts with religious overtones), voters' religiosity is activated. Second, the image shows the path of transcendent accountability. This means that religious symbols make voters feel that political actions are accountable "before God." This condition encourages voters to take politics more seriously, thereby increasing political participation and ultimately increasing the chances of winning. Third, there is a mediating pathway: religious symbols can increase religiopolitical awareness (awareness of the relationship between religion and politics). This means that voters are more aware that political choices are related to religious values and teachings. This awareness then strengthens political participation.

Figure 2. Anti-Corruption Promise of Candidate



Source: Authors, 2026

Figure 2 explains how an individual (or political actor) can decide whether to engage in corruption. First, there are the influences of regulations (domestic and international) and economic and cultural conditions that shape the environment. Second, actors also consider external opportunities. Essentially, an internal calculation emerges within the actor: the expected benefits of corruption compared to the expected costs (e.g., the risk of punishment). If the benefits are greater and the costs are small, the actor is more likely to choose corruption. This tendency may diminish when such costs are high or when clear regulations are in place.

Table 1 outlines the dominant patterns of religious symbolism observed in five regional elections held in 2024. In East Kolaka, for instance, the use of attire rich in religious symbolism and the cultivation of close ties with religious figures played a pivotal role in establishing moral legitimacy among voters. Similarly, the campaign in Ponorogo stood out through public-facing religious

activities, specially crafted campaign messaging, and social media usage designed to project an image of being "close to the people." Meanwhile, regarding electoral capital, the campaign in Central Lampung emphasized ties with Islamic organizations and a moral commitment to anti-corruption accountability. In contrast, the Bekasi campaign combined elements of personal piety with issues concerning governance. Ultimately, Riau also leveraged its Malay-Islamic identity to cultivate a narrative centered on justice and trust as its primary strength.

Table 1. Victories of Five Muslim Regional Head Candidates in the 2024 Regional Elections

No	Regional Name	Department	Pola Symbolism	Religious Dominant	Analytical Notes
1	East Kolaka	Regent	Religious closeness to religious narrative of trust	clothing, to local figures,	Islamic symbols are used to build moral legitimacy in a religious voter base.
2	Ponorogo	Regent	Public religious activities, Islamic campaign language, and religious social media		Religious symbolism strengthens the image of a leader close to the people.
3	Lampung Tengah	Regent	Relations with Islamic organizations, anti-corruption, and moral promises		Religious symbols function as electoral capital in agrarian-religious societies
4	Bekasi	Regent	Representation of personal piety, narrative of clean leadership		Religious symbols combined with regional governance issues
5	Riau	Governor	Malay Islamic identity, the rhetoric of trust and justice		Religious symbolism is integrated with regional cultural identity

Source: Authors, 2026.

The Ethical Paradox of Post-Regional Election Victory: From Moral Legitimacy to Arrests by the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK)

In the context of Indonesia's simultaneous regional head elections (*pilkada*) held in 2024, the concept of an "ethical paradox" requires a precise, analytical definition before empirical evidence can be presented. As used in this study, the term "paradox" refers to a structural condition in which the use of Islamic religious symbolism in the public sphere confers sufficient moral legitimacy to

win an election. Yet, that same legitimacy often proves ineffective in fostering ethical behavior in public office. This does not merely refer to individual moral failure or hypocrisy; rather, the phenomenon illustrates a structural distinction between two analytically separate ethical realms: symbolic morality, encompassing performative acts within the electoral context, and substantive ethics, which demands the application of moral principles to constrain behavior within the context of governance.

The KPK arrests of Abdul Azis, Sugiri Sancoko, Ardito Wijaya, Ade Kuswara Kunang, and Abdul Wahid constitute empirical evidence of a structural decoupling between symbolic legitimacy and substantive governance ethics. During the campaign period, candidates can cultivate a moral image through Islamic markers that voters perceive as a sign of moral commitment. However, once they assume power, these markers fail to constrain their behavior. According to Bourdieu, this distinction is structurally clear: symbolic capital secures recognition in the electoral arena but does not automatically generate the ethical *habitus* required in the realm of governance. Although these religious symbols appeal to voters, they do not impose moral obligations within the logic of institutional power, particularly in a context where governance is dominated by patronage networks and the need to utilize resources.⁵³

Authority rooted in religious displays, whereby voters may accord special moral standing to candidates based on their perceived piety, undermines rational-legal demands for accountability. When legitimacy supplants institutional oversight, conditions conducive to corruption emerge. Studies on prophetic and spiritual leadership models within the Indonesian bureaucracy indicate that religious symbols enter this institutional space as tools for mobilization rather than as a binding ethical framework. Ultimately, this results in an absence of accountability at the structural governance level.

Beyond its symbolic nature, this moral paradox is exacerbated by binding structural conditions within Indonesia's regional autonomy system. Internal audit mechanisms, legislative oversight bodies (DPRD), and civil society controls remain weak and vulnerable to co-optation; meanwhile, post-

⁵³ Akhirul Aminulloh et al., "Political Gimmicks on Social Media in the 2024 Indonesian Presidential Election," *The Journal of Society and Media* 9, no. 1 (April 2025): 74–96, <https://doi.org/10.26740/jsm.v9n1.p74-96>.

election governance grants regional heads extensive discretionary authority over procurement, personnel promotions, and the allocation of regional revenues. These structural conditions can perpetuate rent-seeking practices, even when regional heads possess moral legitimacy upon taking office.

Table 2. Corruption Crimes of Five Muslim Regional Head Candidates in the 2024

No	District head	Date of KPK OTT	Allegations of Corruption	Reference Sources (3 Media)
1	Regent of East Kolaka (Abdul Azis)	August 7, 2025	Allegations of bribery in the regional hospital construction project and procurement of regional goods/services	Antara News (2025); DetikNews (2025); Liputan6 (2025)
2	Regent of Ponorogo (Sugiri Sancoko)	November 7, 2025	Allegations of bribery for job promotions and projects at Dr. Harjono Regional Hospital	Antara News (2025); CNN Indonesia (2025); DetikNews (2025)
3	Regent of Middle Lampung (Ardito Wijaya)	December 9–10, 2025	Allegations of bribery and gratuities in the procurement of goods and services	DetikNews (2025); CNN Indonesia (2025); Media Indonesia (2025)
4	Regent of Bekasi (Ade Kuswara Kunang)	December 18, 2025	Allegations of project “Ijon” bribery and receipt of funds from the private sector	Antara News (2025); DetikNews (2025); Liputan6 (2025)
5	Governor of Riau (Abdul Wahid)	November 3, 2025	Allegations of extortion and abuse of authority	Antara News (2025); CNN Indonesia (2025); Media Indonesia (2025)

Source: Authors, 2026

Table 2 shows that the five Muslim regional heads arrested by the police in 2025 had successfully won the 2024 regional elections by employing Islamic religious symbolism. For each case, Table 2 details the alleged corruption, the date of the Corruption Eradication Commission’s (KPK) sting operation, and the media sources. The previously described paradox is further reinforced by the discovery of three significant analytical patterns following a thorough examination of the data.

The three cross-case patterns underpinning the argument in this section are presented in Table 2. First, the types of corruption involved are structurally consistent: four of the five corruption cases (Abdul Azis, Sugiri Sancoko, Ardito Wijaya, and Ade Kuswara Kunang) occurred in procurement and personnel management sectors where regional heads wield the strongest authority within Indonesia's local government system autonomy framework. This highlights the structural vulnerabilities that arise when power is exercised without clear oversight. Second, the duration of detention, ranging from four months (Abdul Wahid was arrested in November 2025, having taken office in February 2025) to thirteen months (Abdul Azis was arrested in August 2025, having taken office in early 2025), indicates that corrupt practices began following the transition from an elected position to a role involving government administration. Third, all five cases employed the same political strategy: Islamic symbolism was utilized during the campaign to demonstrate credibility and moral integrity, yet the subsequent governance practices revealed a complete absence of these values. This phenomenon is characterized as a shift from symbolic morality to institutionalized rent-seeking. The pattern suggests that this ethical paradox is a systemic feature of the disconnect between religious symbolism, electoral competition, and governance responsibilities within Indonesia's local political landscape.

From the perspective of Islamic political ethics, the corruption committed by the five regional heads constitutes a dual violation: a violation of positive law and of Islamic moral-juridical standards.⁵⁴ Based on the principles of *siyasa shar'iyah*, political authority is a public mandate that must be carried out to carry out applicable justice (*adl*), protect public interests (*maslahah 'ammah*), and fulfill responsibilities to the general public and God (*hisbah*). Therefore, this paradox does not refer to the failure of Islamic political ethics as a normative framework, but rather to the inability to put these principles into practice in the exercise of power.⁵⁵ When Islamic symbols are used as an electoral instrument rather than as an expression of lived

⁵⁴ Yujitia Ahdarrijal and Dian Eka Rahmawati, "The Role of Digital Media in Determining the Direction of Indonesia's Democracy in 2023," *The Journal of Society and Media* 8, no. 1 (April 2024): 144–64, <https://doi.org/10.26740/jsm.v8n1.p144-164>.

⁵⁵ Mutiara Ramadhani Putri Rismawan and Albert E. Barona, "Public Trust in Sidoarjo After The Corruption Case Gus Muhdlor Is Facing in 2024," *Journal of Religion, Local Politics, and Law* 1, no. 3 (July 2025): 156–69, <https://doi.org/10.64595/jrpl.258>.

practice, they generate moral legitimacy without moral obligation. This paradox arises not because of the failure of Islamic political ethics itself, but rather because of the failure to internalize ethical values in political practice, as well as the dominance of pragmatic electoral logic that uses religion as a tool of legitimacy rather than a substantive moral guideline.⁵⁶

Explaining the Paradox of Islamic Political Ethics and Electoral Corruption: Integrating Sociological Theory and Islamic Legal Analysis

The paradox between religious symbolism and post-election corruption in the five cases examined is most precisely explained through an integrated analytical framework that brings Bourdieu's symbolic capital, Weber's charismatic authority, and Islamic political ethics into critical dialogue. Bourdieu's concept of "misrecognition" highlights the mechanics of the electoral process. Voters choose Islamic attributes or symbols displayed by Abdul Azis, Sugiri Sancoko, Ardito Wijaya, Ade Kuswara Kunang, and Abdul Wahid as evidence of an established ethical "*habitus*." However, in reality, these symbols serve as capital that can be used in the competitive electoral arena. Weber's concept of charismatic authority explains post-election dynamics: when charismatic legitimacy undermines rational-legal accountability, institutional oversight of elected leaders weakens, creating structural space for corruption. A normative benchmark for evaluating change is provided by Islamic political ethics based on *siyasa shari'yya*: the principle that power is a public trust that demands substantive justice (*'adl*) and accountability (*hisbah*), rather than referring to acts of piety. By integrating these three frameworks, this paradox emerges structurally because the link between symbolic recognition and ethical obligation has been broken.

A critical analysis of the literature on jurisprudence reveals that *siyasa shar'iyya* and *hisbah* entail significant institutional consequences regarding government accountability in the administration of the state; they do not merely refer to declarative moral principles. This study demonstrates that the principles of *siyasa shar'iyya* can be incorporated into the formulation of national laws and public finance regulations, thereby providing a normative-

⁵⁶ Abdullahi Muhammad Maigari, "Faith Leaders & the Outcome of the 2023 Presidential Election in Nigeria," *The Journal of Society and Media* 8, no. 1 (April 2024): 288-306, <https://doi.org/10.26740/jsm.v8n1.p288-306>.

institutional framework to prevent the abuse of public authority. Hisbah-based oversight demands in the five cases examined that the moral authority candidates claim through religious symbolism be accompanied by transparent governance practices subject to independent scrutiny. The failure of such oversight in East Kolaka, Ponorogo, Central Lampung, Bekasi, and Riau was not due to limitations in Islamic legal theory, but rather the absence of institutional regulations capable of translating *fiqh* into enforceable rules.

Max Weber introduced the concept of charismatic authority to explain this paradox. Leaders who demonstrate piety and employ religious symbols are recognized as charismatic figures possessing extraordinary moral qualities. Religious charisma can supersede rational-legal legitimacy, including, within the context of electoral politics, reducing demands for institutional accountability. When public trust relies on religious conviction rather than legal and oversight systems, the likelihood of abuse of power increases. In his capacity as a leader, he pursued policies that produced a regulatory system that enhanced social stability.⁵⁷

According to Islamic political ethics, power must be exercised as a trust bound by justice and moral obligation. However, Islamic ethics are reduced to symbolic morality when religious symbols are employed as symbolic capital (Bourdieu) and as a source of charisma (Weber). A paradox arises: while the proper use of Islamic symbols can secure electoral victory, it fails to prevent corruption because moral principles are neither internalized within the power structure nor embodied in real life.

A comparative legal analysis reveals that Islamic law and Indonesia's positive anti-corruption legal framework, specifically Law No. 31 of 1999 and Law No. 20 of 2001, are neither entirely identical nor entirely contradictory; the relationship between the two involves both normative overlap and procedural tension. The acts of corruption committed by the five regional heads are classified as *jarimah* (criminal offenses) under Islamic law: *risywah* (bribery) in the cases of Abdul Azis, Sugiri Sancoko, and Ardito Wijaya; *ghulul* (misappropriation of public resources) in Ade Kuswara Kunang's advance-payment project scheme; and *khiyanah al-amanah* (breach of public trust).

⁵⁷ Janatul Rona Megananta and Agus Machfud Fauzi, "Kediri Government Policy Before Year End Holiday Middle of The Covid-19 Pandemic," *International Journal of Law and Society (IJLS)* 1, no. 1 (January 2022): 1-10, <https://doi.org/10.59683/ijls.v1i1.1>.


Under Indonesian law, criminal provisions regarding bribery, gratuities, and abuse of authority, enforced by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), encompass these specific acts. Both legal systems penalize the same conduct due to significant normative overlap. However, procedural tension arises because Islamic law emphasizes moral deterrence and *maqasid*-based justice, elements not always present in the political pressures that shape law enforcement outcomes within Indonesia's statutory legal framework.

Addressing this paradox critically requires moving beyond mere normative recommendations toward the establishment of a concrete institutional framework grounded in both Islamic legal theory and modern governance practices. In the context of local governance in Indonesia, three institutional mechanisms can be derived from the rich scholarship of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). First and foremost, electoral law reform grounded in the ethics of *siyasa shar'iyah* must incorporate an integrity vetting system that evaluates candidates' governance track records rather than merely their religious symbolism as a criterion for their eligibility to participate in elections. Second, independent oversight bodies must be strengthened to implement the principle of *hisbah*; this could be achieved by expanding the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)'s preventive functions. The mandate and empowerment of regional audit bodies (BPK/BPKP), and the implementation of civil society oversight regarding procurement and personnel decisions, areas that revealed systemic vulnerabilities in the five arrest cases. Third, the structural financial pressures driving post-election rent-seeking practices are addressed through *fiqh*-based measures to combat money politics. These include anti-corruption education integrated into religious institutions, such as *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) and *majelis taklim* (religious study groups), as well as transparent Islamic financial instruments for campaign funding. By working synergistically, these mechanisms will foster consistency between *amanah* (trust/integrity), as a symbol employed in campaigns, and *amanah* as a standard for government administrative practice.

From an Islamic perspective, the normative-juridical approach necessitates strengthening legal accountability to protect regional heads against corruption, whether at the planning stage or regarding actions already taken. Regional heads require institutional oversight to prevent interference while carrying out their post-election duties, thereby ensuring the effective

functioning of these institutions. Thirdly, the Hisbah system serves as a mechanism for moral oversight following the election. To prevent the abuse of power, which constitutes a betrayal of the public trust established, Islamic political ethics demand consistency between symbols, promises, and actions. Corruption among regional heads would cease to occur if these principles were properly implemented.

Figure 3. Integrated Socio-Legal Conceptual Framework



Source: Authors, 2026

A cross-case pattern emerges from the deployment of symbolic capital and charismatic legitimacy across these five cases. Religious symbolism fosters moral legitimacy, often misconstrued as a substantive ethical compact, thereby generating heightened voter trust, as evidenced in the 2024 local elections. By synthesizing the concepts of Bourdieu and Weber, this analysis demonstrates how symbolic capital (organizational ties, endorsements from

religious figures, religious *habitus*) and charismatic authority (displays of piety, spiritual lineage) converge to create a regime of legitimacy that voters accept as proof of trustworthiness (*amanah*) and justice (*adl*). However, this symbolic legitimacy is structurally distinct from post-election governance. Exorbitant campaign costs and networks of religious intermediaries drive rent-seeking practices that are incongruent with the moral commitments demonstrated during the campaign. The arrest of five regional heads by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) illustrates this central paradox: while religious symbolism embodies the moral authority required to win an election, the accumulation of symbolic capital and charismatic mobilization actually generate structural pressures toward corruption, revealing a gap between campaign legitimacy and governance integrity that characterizes the relationship between elections and corruption.

Conclusion

By introducing the concept of a "structural separation" between substantive ethics and symbolic morality, this study explains why religious symbolism succeeds in elections yet fails to address corruption within Muslim-majority populations. Bourdieu argues that voters perceive religious symbols as an ethic they can adopt, a misperception that is reinforced rather than corrected. However, this perspective reveals a form of strategic instrumentalization. According to Weber, the charismatic authority generated through religious symbolism can alter rational-legal accountability structures and create vulnerabilities in governance. In the electoral arena, religious symbolism functions as symbolic capital; yet, because these spheres operate on distinct structural logics, such ethical habits do not translate into the realm of governance. This disconnect manifests at three levels: the individual (strategic instrumentalization), the institutional (lack of oversight and high election costs), and the cultural (normalization of performative piety). Theoretically, this encompasses the concept of a "structural separation" between substantive ethics and symbolic morality. This concept serves as a mechanism for explaining why religious symbolism can confer voter legitimacy without translating into the accountability required for governance committed to equitable leadership. Methodologically, this approach integrates *siyāsa*

shar'iyya jurisprudence, Weberian authority theory, and Bourdieu's political sociology into a unified analytical framework.

Future research should conduct comparative analyses across Muslim-majority democracies, gather primary data, specifically through interviews with candidates, voters, and officials from the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and conduct ongoing studies to understand the relationship between the use of religious symbolism in campaigns and the integrity of governance. To enhance democratic accountability in religiously diverse societies, it is crucial to understand the role this symbolic capital plays in elections and governance.

Acknowledgement

The authors would like to express their sincere gratitude to the Faculty of Social Sciences and Politics, Universitas Negeri Surabaya, for its academic support and the supportive scholarly environment provided throughout the completion of this research. The authors also thank their colleagues and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and constructive suggestions, which have helped improve the quality of this manuscript. Furthermore, the authors acknowledge the responsible use of several artificial intelligence (AI)-based language tools during manuscript preparation, specifically to enhance the clarity of academic English, refine grammar, and improve paragraph structure. All AI-generated content has been reviewed, verified, and substantially revised by the authors, who bear full responsibility for the accuracy, originality, and integrity of this final manuscript.

Disclosure Statement

Agus Machfud Fauzi, Iffatin Nur, Novi Fitia Maliha, Ahmad Ridwan, and Hazim declare that they have no competing financial interests, personal relationships, institutional affiliations, or other known conflicts of interest that could influence the research, writing, or publication of this article. The authors affirm that this research was conducted independently, with integrity, and in accordance with applicable academic and ethical standards. All authors made substantial contributions to the conception and design of the study, data collection and analysis, interpretation of findings, drafting and critical revision of the manuscript, and approved the final version for publication. Furthermore,

all authors agree to take responsibility for all aspects of this work and affirm that the manuscript is original, has not been previously published, and is not under consideration for publication elsewhere.

References

- Ahdarrijal, Yujitia, and Dian Eka Rahmawati. "The Role of Digital Media in Determining the Direction of Indonesia's Democracy in 2023." *The Journal of Society and Media* 8, no. 1 (April 2024): 144–64. <https://doi.org/10.26740/jsm.v8n1.p144-164>.
- Akbar, Adrial. "KPK Tangani 439 Perkara Sepanjang Tahun 2025, 69 Masih Penyelidikan." *detik.com*, accessed December 2025. <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-8272780/kpk-tangani-439-perkara-sepanjang-tahun-2025-69-masih-penyelidikan>.
- Alazzabi, Waled Younes E., Hasri Mustafa, and Ahmed Razman Abdul Latiff. "Corruption and Control from the Perspective of Islam." *Journal of Financial Crime* 27, no. 2 (January 2020): 355–68. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-02-2019-0020>.
- Aminulloh, Akhirul, Kun Sila Ananda, Prawinda Putri Anzari, Latif Fianto, and Fathul Qorib. "Political Gimmicks on Social Media in the 2024 Indonesian Presidential Election." *The Journal of Society and Media* 9, no. 1 (April 2025): 74–96. <https://doi.org/10.26740/jsm.v9n1.p74-96>.
- Amir Mahmud and Dewien Nabelah Agustin. "The Influence of 'Santri Identification' on the Choice of Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidates Based on Religion in the 2024 Presidential Election." *Journal of Religion, Local Politics, and Law* 1, no. 2 (July 2025): 130–43. <https://doi.org/10.64595/jrlpl.261>.
- Anwar, Syahrul, Mohd Anuar Ramli, and Muhammad Nuruddien. "Autonomy and Islamic Criminal Law Enforcement in Creating Social Order in Aceh Region." *De Jure: Jurnal Hukum dan Syar'iah* 17, no. 2 (September 2025): 438–57. <https://doi.org/10.18860/j-fsh.v17i2.32771>.
- Assem-Erhaze, Eunice K., and Mandy M. Archibald. "Reimagining Inquiry: A Transformative Integration of Mixed Methods Action Research and Qualitatively Driven Designs in Disability Research Contexts." *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, November 25, 2025, 15586898251398262. <https://doi.org/10.1177/15586898251398262>.
- Awaluddin, Syah, Jantje Tjiptabudy, Barzah Latupono, and Sartje Sarah Alfons. "Between Worship and Bribery: Charity in the Shadow of Electoral

- Politics." *De Jure: Jurnal Hukum dan Syar'iah* 17, no. 1 (June 2025): 255–376. <https://doi.org/10.18860/j-fsh.v17i1.32615>.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984. https://monoskop.org/images/e/e0/Pierre_Bourdieu_Distinction_A_Social_Critique_of_the_Judgement_of_Taste_1984.pdf.
- Creutzfeldt, Naomi, Marc Mason, and Kirsten McConnachie, eds. *Routledge Handbook of Socio-Legal Theory and Methods*. Routledge Handbooks. London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.
- Din, Salah Ud, Sharifah Hayaati Syed Ismail, and Raja Hisyamudin Raja Sulong. "Combating Corruption Based on Al-Siyasah al-Syar'iiyyah Perspective: A Literature Review." *International Journal of Ethics and Systems* 40, no. 4 (December 2024): 776–807. <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOES-12-2022-0312>.
- El-Bassiouny, Dina, Amr Kotb, Hany Elbardan, and Noha El-Bassiouny. "To Blow or Not to Blow the Whistle? An Islamic Framework." *Journal of Business Ethics* 187, no. 2 (October 2023): 385–404. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-022-05274-z>.
- Fauzi, Agus Machfud, Novi Fitia Maliha, Pambudi Handoyo, Eufrasia Kartika Hanindraputri, and Suyatno Ladiqi. "Santri Community, Charisma, and the Contrast Political Agency: Electoral Victory and Defeat in Jombang and Mojokerto, Indonesia." *Ascarya: Journal of Islamic Science, Culture, and Social Studies* 5, no. 2 (December 2025): 224–35. <https://doi.org/10.53754/xzzh8v16>.
- Fauzi, Agus Machfud, Novi Fitia Maliha, Iffatin Nur, Ahmad Ridwan, Eufrasia Kartika Hanindraputri, and Mohammad Reevany Bustami. "Politicization of Agrarian Legal Conflict as Political Capital: A Fiqh Siyasah Perspective." *De Jure: Jurnal Hukum dan Syariah* 18, no. 1 (June): 126–49. <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.18860/j-fsh.v18i1.41410>.
- Fauzi, Agus Machfud, Moh Mudzakir, and Mohamed Omar Abdulrahim. "Social Conflict In Contestation Of Indonesia Election." *The Journal of Society and Media* 3, no. 2 (October 2019): 159. <https://doi.org/10.26740/jsm.v3n2.p159-177>.
- Fauzi, Am, A. Sudrajat, A. Affandi, and A. Raditya. "Maintaining Identity Political Culture In Indonesia." *Journal of Physics: Conference Series* 953 (January 2018): 012185. <https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/953/1/012185>.
- Fitriyanti, Adinda Dwi, and Nirmala Anggur Aulia. "Shalawatan as the Head Election Campaign Website for Region Karangpoh Village, Menganti,

- Gresik." *Journal of Religion, Local Politics, and Law* 1, no. 4 (October 2025): 296–308. <https://doi.org/10.64595/jrlpl.v1n4.p309-319>.
- Gokcekus, Omer, and Tufan Ekici. "Religion, Religiosity, and Corruption." *Review of Religious Research* 62, no. 4 (December 2020): 563–81. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13644-020-00421-2>.
- Hakim, Arif Rahman, and Putro Samudro. "State Religion and Corruption in Islamic Countries: An Empirical Examination." *Muslim Business and Economics Review* 4, no. 2 (December 2025): 256–77. <https://doi.org/10.56529/mber.v4i2.379>.
- Hanifah, Mardalena, and Muhammad Adil. "Legal Culture and Law Enforcement in Indonesia: A Normative Juridical Perspective." *Eduvest - Journal of Universal Studies* 5, no. 6 (June 2025): 6332–41. <https://doi.org/10.59188/eduvest.v5i6.49987>.
- Harrits, Gitte Sommer. "Political Power as Symbolic Capital and Symbolic Violence." *Journal of Political Power* 4, no. 2 (August 2011): 237–58. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2011.589178>.
- Hawari, Nadirsah, Agustam Agustam, and Muntaha Artalim. "The role of religious study groups in fostering anti-corruption behavior and its implications for local democratic practices in metro city." *Akademika: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 28, no. 1 (June 2023): 57–70. <https://doi.org/10.32332/akademika.v28i1.6499>.
- Karim, Abdul, Oman Fathurrohman, Muhammadun, Wahyu Saripudin, Diding Rahmat, and Firman Mansir. "Altruistic Works, Religion, and Corruption: Kiai s' Leadership to Shape Anti-Corruption Values in Pesantren." *Cogent Social Sciences* 9, no. 1 (December 2023): 2238968. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2023.2238968>.
- Khoirin, Nur, and Mahfudz Junaedi. "Religious Inconsistency on Corruption Behavior among Muslim Politicians in Indonesia." *HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies* 78, no. 4 (June 2022). <https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v78i1.7361>.
- Kustiawan, Abdul Muien, Sepwana Manda Efaprast, Alysia Arianto, and Muhammad Juni H. "Al-Mawardi's Thoughts and Its Relevance to Contemporary Political Systems." *Jurnal Tapis: Jurnal Teropong Aspirasi Politik Islam* 21, no. 2 (December 2025): 127–54. <https://doi.org/10.24042/tps.v22i2.28980>.
- Marlier, Mathieu, Steffie Lucidarme, Greet Cardon, Ilse De Bourdeaudhuij, Kathy Babiak, and Annick Willem. "Capacity Building through Cross-Sector Partnerships: A Multiple Case Study of a Sport Program in

- Disadvantaged Communities in Belgium.” *BMC Public Health* 15, no. 1 (December 2015): 1306. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-015-2605-5>.
- Marta, Auradian, Utang Suwaryo, Affan Sulaeman, and Leo Agustino. “The Crisis of Democratic Governance in Contemporary Indonesia.” *Jurnal Ilmiah Peuradeun* 8, no. 1 (January 2020): 109–28. <https://doi.org/10.26811/peuradeun.v8i1.368>.
- McKinnon, Andrew M., Marta Trzebiatowska, and Christopher Craig Brittain. “Bourdieu, Capital, and Conflict in a Religious Field: The Case of the ‘Homosexuality’ Conflict in the Anglican Communion.” *Journal of Contemporary Religion* 26, no. 3 (October 2011): 355–70. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537903.2011.616033>.
- Megananta, Janatul Rona, and Agus Machfud Fauzi. “Kediri Government Policy Before Year-End Holiday Middle of The Covid-19 Pandemic.” *International Journal of Law and Society (IJLS)* 1, no. 1 (January 2022): 1–10. <https://doi.org/10.59683/ijls.v1i1.1>.
- Moffitt, Benjamin, and Simon Tormey. “Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatization and Political Style.” *Political Studies* 62, no. 2 (June 2014): 381–97. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12032>.
- Muhammad Maigari, Abdullahi. “Faith Leaders & the Outcome of the 2023 Presidential Election in Nigeria.” *The Journal of Society and Media* 8, no. 1 (April 2024): 288–306. <https://doi.org/10.26740/jsm.v8n1.p288-306>.
- Negara, Tunggul Ansari Setia. “Normative Legal Research in Indonesia: Its Origins and Approaches.” *Audito Comparative Law Journal (ACLJ)* 4, no. 1 (February 2023): 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.22219/aclj.v4i1.24855>.
- Novelino, Andry. “Daftar Kepala Daerah Hingga Anggota Kabinet Tersangkut Korupsi Di 2025.” *CNN Indonesia*, accessed December 2025. <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20251224144827-12-1310346/daftar-kepala-daerah-hingga-anggota-kabinet-tersangkut-korupsi-di-2025>.
- Qosim, M. Rizal, Hajar Salamah Salsabila Hariz, Yusuf Ibrahim Arowosaiye, Mabarroh Azizah, and Idamatussilmi. “The Politicization of Religion and Law Enforcement in Indonesia’s Democratic Elections: An Islamic Legal Perspective.” *Al-Manahij: Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam*, December 19, 2025, 313–34. <https://doi.org/10.24090/mnh.v19i2.15244>.
- Riady, Roy, Febrian Febrian, Nashriana Nashriana, and M. Yusuf. “Reformulating the Reversal of the Burden of Proof in Corruption Cases: Integrating Positive Law and Islamic Legal Principles.” *Nurani: Jurnal Kajian Syari’ah Dan Masyarakat* 25, no. 2 (October 2025): 514–28. <https://doi.org/10.19109/nurani.v25i2.30483>.

- Rismawan, Mutiara Ramadhani Putri, and Albert E. Barona. "Public Trust in Sidoarjo After The Corruption Case Gus Muhdlor Is Facing in 2024." *Journal of Religion, Local Politics, and Law* 1, no. 3 (July 2025): 156–69. <https://doi.org/10.64595/jrlpl.258>.
- Ruslan, Idrus Ruslan, Rijal Ulil Abshar, and Gesit Yudha. "Ethics and Behavior of Islamic Politics." *Jurnal Tapis: Jurnal Teropong Aspirasi Politik Islam* 21, no. 1 (June 2025): 1–24. <https://doi.org/10.24042/wfzr8v37>.
- Saha, Asoke Kumar, Atanu Kumar Dogra, Arunavo Bairagi, Vijay Pratap Singh, Md. Alamgir Hossain and Sayma Akter Pata. "Perception of Corruption across Gender, Religion, and Socioeconomic Status." *Humanitas: Indonesian Psychological Journal*, August 28, 2023, 129–35. <https://doi.org/10.26555/humanitas.v20i2.120>.
- Salahudin, Iradhad Taqwa Sihidi, Ali Roziqin, Tinuk Dwi Cahyani, Kisman Karinda, Muhammad Firdaus, and Tawakkal Baharuddin. "Research Theme Mapping and Future Directions on Corruption and Religion: A Bibliometric Analysis." *Frontiers in Sociology* 10 (March 2025). <https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2025.1502700>.
- Sellametha Alike Permata Gunaeri and Najwa Fadhilatul Khusna. "The Influence of Public Debate on Political Awareness and Voter Rationality in the Rembang Regional Election." *Journal of Religion, Local Politics, and Law* 1, no. 2 (July 2025): 103–13. <https://doi.org/10.64595/jrlpl.200>.
- Sibawaihi, Muhammad, Devika Rosa Guspita, and Badriyah Badriyah. "Islamic Legal Strategies in Indonesian Contexts to Combat Cybercrime and the Spread of Illegal Data Dissemination." *Justicia Islamica* 21, no. 2 (November 2024): 357–76. <https://doi.org/10.21154/justicia.v21i2.9587>.
- Sommer, Udi, Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom, and Gizem Arikan. "Does Faith Limit Immorality? The Politics of Religion and Corruption." *Democratization* 20, no. 2 (March 2013): 287–309. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.650914>.
- Srihadiastuti, Rida, and Mahjus Ekananda. "Corruption, Public Debt, Political Years, and Economic Growth in Democratic Developing Countries." *Integritas: Jurnal Antikorupsi* 10, no. 2 (February 2025): 197–210. <https://doi.org/10.32697/integritas.v10i2.1264>.
- Sudarmanto, Eko, Junet Kaswoto, Warto Warto, Mamdukh Budiman, and Zubaidi Wahyono. "Maqashid Sharia as a Framework for Innovation in Corruption Prevention." *International Journal of Islamic Thought and Humanities* 4, no. 1 (March 2025): 38–50. <https://doi.org/10.54298/ijith.v4i1.313>.

- Sukardi, Sukardi, Muhammad Adib Alfarisi, and Riyani Riyani. "Systems of Government in Islamic Countries: The Dynamics of Sharia Law from the Prophetic Period to the Modern Era." *Justicia Islamica* 21, no. 2 (November 2024): 291–312. <https://doi.org/10.21154/justicia.v21i2.8465>.
- Sumaktoyo, Nathanael Gratias, and Burhanuddin Muhtadi. "Can Religion Save Corrupt Politicians? Evidence from Indonesia." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 34, no. 1 (February 2022): edab029. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edab029>.
- Sutopo, Umarwan, Achmad Hasan Basri, and Hilman Rosyidi. "Presidential Threshold in The 2024 Presidential Elections: Implications for The Benefits of Democracy In Indonesia." *Justicia Islamica* 21, no. 1 (June 2024): 155–78. <https://doi.org/10.21154/justicia.v21i1.7577>.
- Swartz, David. "Bridging the Study of Culture and Religion: Pierre Bourdieu's Political Economy of Symbolic Power." *Sociology of Religion* 57, no. 1 (March 1996): 71–85. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3712005>.
- Syifa, Siti Nur, Muhammad Torieq Abdillah, and Fadil Sj. "The Legal Responsibility of the General Elections Commission in the 2024 Election Data Leak: Integration of Personal Data Protection Laws and the Principle of Sadd al-Dharī'At." *Justicia Islamica* 22, no. 1 (July 2025): 185–210. <https://doi.org/10.21154/justicia.v22i1.10390>.
- Tedhalosa, Adhing, Hibnu Nugroho, Agus Raharjo, and Azmi Syahputra. "Bridging Justice Systems: Asset Confiscation in Anti-Corruption Law and Islamic Jurisprudence." *Asy-Syir'ah: Jurnal Ilmu Syari'ah Dan Hukum* 59, no. 1 (October 2025): 112–30. <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajish.v59i1.1611>.
- Turner, C. "Modernity and Politics in the Work of Max Weber." *Choice Reviews Online* 30, no. 11 (July 1993): 30-6462-30-6462. <https://doi.org/10.5860/CHOICE.30-6462>.
- Urban, Hugh. "Sacred Capital: Pierre Bourdieu and the Study of Religion." *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 15, no. 4 (2003): 354–89. <https://doi.org/10.1163/157006803322697416>.
- Van Den Brandeler, Francine. "Methodology." In *Scalar Mismatches in Metropolitan Water Governance*, by Francine Van Den Brandeler, 29–46. Water Governance - Concepts, Methods, and Practice. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-08061-6_2.
- Weber, Max. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. United States of America. Oxford University Press, New York INc., 1947. https://ia804503.us.archive.org/32/items/weber-max.-the-theory-of-social-and-economic-organization-1947_202106/Weber.

- Xu, Xixiong, Yaoqin Li, Xing Liu, and Weiyu Gan. "Does Religion Matter to Corruption? Evidence from China." *China Economic Review* 42 (February 2017): 34–49. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2016.11.005>.
- Yahya, Khulida Kirana, Tan Fee Yean, Johanim Johari, and Nur Ain Saad. "The Perception of Gen Y on Organizational Culture, Religiosity and Corruption in Malaysian Public Organizations." *Procedia Economics and Finance* 31 (2015): 251–61. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671\(15\)01227-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(15)01227-7).
- Zelekha, Yaron, and Gil Avnimelech. "Cultural and Personal Channels between Religion, Religiosity, and Corruption." *Heliyon* 9, no. 6 (June 2023): e16882. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e16882>.

